◼ Beyond Vilica, Hedlund and Schectman's relationship is murky. In a letter to the federal probation office, Schectman said he took Hedlund under his wing as a paralegal and a clerk, and even tried to help him gain a State Bar apprenticeship.
However, after pleading guilty, Hedlund told the government that he had moved his office into Schectman's "to protect [my] documents from seizure by federal authorities," according to a DEA affidavit.
Hedlund entered his plea on Feb. 4, 2008, after preparing his holdings for forfeiture. On Feb. 3, Schectman resigned as Vilica's president. Hedlund's sentencing is scheduled for the end of this month; the government is seeking 63 months in prison.
That was Pubdate: Fri, 13 Feb 2009
Showing posts with label Cases to watch. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Cases to watch. Show all posts
Tuesday, June 14, 2011
Thursday, May 26, 2011
Photos and Video from Pedreros Child-Murder Case
◼ includes a statement from Pedreros attorney Russ Clanton and Sophia's father at northcoastjournal.com
In this week’s issue of the Journal — on streets today, online tomorrow — interns Travis Turner and Preston Drake-Hillyard report on the tragic case of Claudia Pedreros, the McKinleyville woman accused of drowning her 2 1/2-year-old daughter Sophia in the Trinity River last weekend.
Sunday, May 22, 2011
Terribly, horribly sad. Missing 2-year-old found dead in Trinity River; mother charged with murder, UPDATE: Pedreros admits to killing her
◼ Missing 2-year-old found dead in Trinity River; mother charged with murder - Times-Standard
A McKinleyville toddler who was the subject of a major search effort in Humboldt and Trinity counties was found dead in the Trinity River north of Coffee Creek on Saturday afternoon, according to law enforcement.◼ Missing child's mom says she doesn't know how she got to Trinity; official says woman 'doesn't have any recollection of having a daughter' - Times-Standard
Her mother is now being charged with murder.
Pedreros, 30, was found at 9 a.m. walking naked on Highway 3 near Coffee Creek Road and Trinity Lake. Deputies suspected that Pedreros has mental health issues or was under the influence of a narcotic, according to the Humboldt County Sheriff's Office.UPDATE: ◼ McKinleyville woman admits to drowning her 2-year-old daughter - Times-Standard
◼ UPDATED: Sheriff says mother confessed to drowning daughter in Trinity River Record Searchlight
Friday, May 20, 2011
Man arrested in connection with 2002 murder; officials say DNA 'cold hit' reopened stabbing death case
◼ Man arrested in connection with 2002 murder; officials say DNA 'cold hit' reopened stabbing death case
A man accused of fatally stabbing a 46-year-old woman who was discovered dead in her Eureka apartment nine years ago pleaded not guilty to murder charges Thursday.
Joseph Eugene Miller, 42, is accused of murdering Beverly Jean Jacob, whose body was discovered in April 2002 after a maintenance man notified police there was a foul smell coming from her E Street apartment. Officials suspected she had been dead for up to three weeks. The coroner's office said Jacob died as a result of numerous stab wounds to the neck and chest.
A preliminary hearing date is set for June 2 to determine if there is enough evidence to go to trial. Miller's bail is set at $1 million....
For five years, the identity of Jacob's murderer remained a mystery. Her file grew cold in the Eureka Police Department, but in 2007 a DNA “cold hit” warmed the case up. The hit, obtained by a criminalist from the Department of Justice Bureau of Forensic Services, revealed Miller's DNA on an item of clothing worn by Jacob at the time of her death, officials said....
Thursday, May 12, 2011
Hate crime suspects turn themselves in to Eureka police
◼ Hate crime suspects turn themselves in to Eureka police - 5/12 TS
◼ Sheriff's Office searching for two men suspected of hate crime 5/9 TS
The Eureka Police Department said Jamie Sean Hunt, 32, and Jeremy Lee Schweizer, 30, both of Eureka, surrendered to police at 3:30 a.m. and were booked into the Humboldt County jail on charges of strong-armed robbery, committing a hate crime, attempting to pass a fraudulent document and assault and battery. Their bail is set at $50,000 each.◼ Humboldt County Sheriff's Office searching for two men suspected of hate crime 5/10 TS
According to the Humboldt County Sheriff's Office, Hunt and Schweizer allegedly attempted to pay for gasoline with a counterfeit $100 bill at about 9 p.m. on Sunday...
◼ Sheriff's Office searching for two men suspected of hate crime 5/9 TS
Tuesday, April 19, 2011
EPD Chief Garr Nielsen said Monday that he only learned of the DA's investigation last week and expressed disappointment that he wasn't notified of a criminal investigation targeting one of his officers.
◼ Kalis arrested: Former Eureka Police Department officer booked, released Monday
Former Eureka police Officer Daniel “Danny” Kalis was brought into custody Monday, some six months after a misdemeanor warrant was issued for his arrest.
Kalis -- who was charged last week with drug possession, theft and other charges -- was named in the September 2010 warrant after failing to appear at a court hearing in which he was to be arraigned on four misdemeanor Department of Fish and Game violations.
Humboldt County District Attorney Chief Investigator Mike Hislop said he called Kalis on Monday and he agreed to turn himself in.
”We met him down at the Bayshore Mall and he surrendered there,” Hislop said. “He was completely cooperative.”
Hislop said Kalis was booked into jail on Monday and was released after promising to appear May 16 for an arraignment on both the old and new charges.
Kalis was placed on administrative leave by the EPD on March 7, the same day the department launched an internal affairs investigation into allegations surrounding his conduct. He resigned from the force on April 1.
The DA's Office announced last week that it was charging Kalis with nine criminal counts -- including heroin and marijuana possession, petty theft, false imprisonment, vandalism and accessing DMV records without authorization -- on the heels of an investigation it launched in January.
EPD Chief Garr Nielsen said Monday that he only learned of the DA's investigation last week and expressed disappointment that he wasn't notified of a criminal investigation targeting one of his officers.
What?
EPD Chief Garr Nielsen said Monday that he only learned of the DA's investigation last week and expressed disappointment that he wasn't notified of a criminal investigation targeting one of his officers.
”I think that, as the head of an organization, I should be notified when one of my personnel is under investigation unless that investigation directly involves me,” Nielsen said. “First of all, I think it's common courtesy. But it would also ensure that I don't have someone out there that is potentially a threat to the public that I'm not aware of, or somebody who is potentially compromising confidential information that I'm not aware of.”
Hislop said Nielsen had contacted him and expressed his views.
The investigator said it was a difficult decision not to inform Nielsen -- a decision ultimately made by District Attorney Paul Gallegos.
”We really mulled it over for a long time,” Hislop said....
◼ Accused officer on the job with warrant out; officer faced misdemeanor charges in 2010; ex-wife files for restraining order
◼ Kalis arrested: Former Eureka Police Department officer booked, released Monday
◼ Former EPD officer arrested on outstanding warrant, released
◼ Accused officer on the job with warrant out; officer faced misdemeanor charges in 2010; ex-wife files for restraining order
Former Eureka police Officer Daniel “Danny” Kalis was brought into custody Monday, some six months after a misdemeanor warrant was issued for his arrest.
Kalis -- who was charged last week with drug possession, theft and other charges -- was named in the September 2010 warrant after failing to appear at a court hearing in which he was to be arraigned on four misdemeanor Department of Fish and Game violations.
Humboldt County District Attorney Chief Investigator Mike Hislop said he called Kalis on Monday and he agreed to turn himself in.
”We met him down at the Bayshore Mall and he surrendered there,” Hislop said. “He was completely cooperative.”
Hislop said Kalis was booked into jail on Monday and was released after promising to appear May 16 for an arraignment on both the old and new charges.
Kalis was placed on administrative leave by the EPD on March 7, the same day the department launched an internal affairs investigation into allegations surrounding his conduct. He resigned from the force on April 1.
The DA's Office announced last week that it was charging Kalis with nine criminal counts -- including heroin and marijuana possession, petty theft, false imprisonment, vandalism and accessing DMV records without authorization -- on the heels of an investigation it launched in January.
EPD Chief Garr Nielsen said Monday that he only learned of the DA's investigation last week and expressed disappointment that he wasn't notified of a criminal investigation targeting one of his officers.
What?
EPD Chief Garr Nielsen said Monday that he only learned of the DA's investigation last week and expressed disappointment that he wasn't notified of a criminal investigation targeting one of his officers.
”I think that, as the head of an organization, I should be notified when one of my personnel is under investigation unless that investigation directly involves me,” Nielsen said. “First of all, I think it's common courtesy. But it would also ensure that I don't have someone out there that is potentially a threat to the public that I'm not aware of, or somebody who is potentially compromising confidential information that I'm not aware of.”
Hislop said Nielsen had contacted him and expressed his views.
The investigator said it was a difficult decision not to inform Nielsen -- a decision ultimately made by District Attorney Paul Gallegos.
”We really mulled it over for a long time,” Hislop said....
◼ Accused officer on the job with warrant out; officer faced misdemeanor charges in 2010; ex-wife files for restraining order
◼ Kalis arrested: Former Eureka Police Department officer booked, released Monday
◼ Former EPD officer arrested on outstanding warrant, released
◼ Accused officer on the job with warrant out; officer faced misdemeanor charges in 2010; ex-wife files for restraining order
Saturday, April 02, 2011
But were they wearing their Carhartt vests?
◼ Fernbridge Cafe owner arrested over food safety concerns
Investigators with the Humboldt County District Attorney's Office arrested the operator of Fernbridge Cafe on Thursday after a months-long investigation into the food and water safety quality at the cafe.
Steve Sterbeck was taken into custody after a series of attempts by the county to address water quality issues, according to a press release from the District Attorney's Office. A March 18 test of the restaurant's water showed high levels of E. coli bacteria, which can cause severe illness and in some cases death, the DA's office said.
The Humboldt County Division of Environmental Health served a “Notice of Suspension of Food Facility Permit” later that day, and Sterbeck was advised to close the restaurant. When the cafe was still open and serving food on Thursday, Sterbeck was arrested.
While the investigation into the incident remains ongoing, Sterbeck has since been released, according to the DA's office. No charges have been filed. Deputy District Attorney Christa McKimmy is evaluating the case for any further action, the release said.
Thursday, March 31, 2011
(Updated) Interesting case about to hit the fan? - THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ROCKY CROWL, Defendant and Appellant.
[DOC] DOC - California Courts
File Format: Microsoft Word - View as HTML
◼ Mar 29, 2011 ... The People appeal after the trial court granted the motion of Rocky Crowl ( defendant) to dismiss the information on the ground that the ...
www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/nonpub/A127221.DOC
Filed 3/29/11 P. v. Crowl CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ROCKY CROWL, Defendant and Appellant.
A127221 (Humboldt County Super. Ct. No. CR093710)
The People appeal after the trial court granted the motion of Rocky Crowl (defendant) to dismiss the information on the ground that the prosecution violated his constitutional right to compulsory process by intimidating defense witnesses. On appeal, the People contend the prosecution did not violate defendant’s right to compulsory process by charging two defense witnesses with having committed perjury at defendant’s preliminary hearing. We shall affirm the trial court’s order dismissing the information.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant was charged by information with driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)—count one); driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 or more (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)—count two), with the further allegation that his blood alcohol level exceeded .15 percent (Veh. Code, § 23578); and driving on a suspended or revoked license (Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a)—count three). It was further alleged as to counts one and two that defendant had committed an alcohol-related driving offense within the past 10 years (Veh. Code, § 23550), and as to count three that defendant had suffered a prior conviction for driving with a suspended or revoked license (Veh. Code, § 14601.5, subd. (a)).
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the information on the ground that the prosecutor had committed misconduct by dissuading defense witnesses from testifying. Following a hearing, on October 26, 2009, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the information.
On December 22, 2009, the People filed a notice of appeal.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Charged Offenses
Ferndale Police Officer Jason Hynes testified that, on June 16, 2009, at around 4:35 p.m., he saw a small, white car stall near the intersection of Main Street and Shaw Avenue in Ferndale; he was about 80 feet away from the stalled vehicle. The car, which was missing its front and rear windshields as well as its side rear windows, was splattered with blue paint, and had a hood that was about to fall off, started up again and passed within about 20 feet of where he stood. He saw three occupants inside the car. The driver had short dark hair and dark facial hair. The male passenger in the front seat was lighter skinned and had short light hair and facial hair. The female in the right rear passenger seat had dirty blond or light brown hair. The car was driving at the speed limit and was not swerving, but the absence of a windshield drew his attention.
Hynes saw the vehicle turn into a city parking lot. He wanted to investigate, so he went back to the Ferndale Police Department to get another officer to accompany him. About five minutes later, Hynes drove to the parking lot with Officer Frank. He saw the car, but there was no one inside. The officers started to look for the three people he had seen in the car and, about two minutes later, he saw them come around a corner. He recognized the man he had seen driving the car; he later identified the man as defendant. Defendant briefly ducked into a causeway, and then came back out. After contacting defendant, Hynes observed signs that he was intoxicated, including a stalling walk, the smell of alcohol, red and watery eyes, and slurred speech.
While Hynes was talking to defendant, the other two people, defendant’s girlfriend, Jessica Sneed, and his cousin, Christopher Crowl (Christopher), were five or more feet away. They did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Hynes said he had seen defendant driving, and defendant stated that he had been driving. Defendant said he came to Ferndale to buy cigarettes and told Hynes that he had drunk five beers earlier in the day. Sneed said defendant had consumed about four beers. At some point, Christopher asked, “What if I was driving?”
Hynes then conducted several field sobriety tests on defendant, which demonstrated a high level of intoxication. Defendant refused to take a final “walk and turn” test, telling Hynes to take him to jail. Hynes then arrested defendant. After Hynes placed defendant in the patrol car, defendant became combative; he yelled, swore, and banged his head on the rear seat. Once at the police station, defendant was a bit calmer, but still exploded at times. He told Hynes that “he would not stop. He would continue to drink and drive.” A breathalyzer (“EPAS”) test administered at the police station registered a blood-alcohol level of .245 percent.
Hynes acknowledged that both at the time of the incident and at the hearing, Christopher’s hair and facial hair lengths were similar to defendant’s hair and facial hair lengths. He also acknowledged that the two men were roughly similar in build.
Christopher testified that defendant is his cousin. On the day that defendant was arrested, Christopher, defendant, and defendant’s girlfriend had driven from a friend’s house in Loleta to Ferndale in a little white Geo automobile that they had borrowed from another cousin.
Christopher drove the car from Loleta to Ferndale and into the city parking lot. The three of them then went into a liquor store. When they came back outside, a police officer made contact with them and began to question defendant. During that conversation, Christopher told the officer that he had been driving the car. The officer said to “shut up, I was lying and I wasn’t drunk. Shut up and stay out of it.”
Christopher testified that his and defendant’s hair and beard lengths were pretty similar and that they are about the same height; defendant is a couple of years older than Christopher. He described defendant’s hair color as “blondish brown” or “light brown,” and his own hair color as “dark blond.”
On cross-examination, Christopher acknowledged that he knew that defendant had some prior DUI convictions. He thought defendant had drunk a beer or two that day and was “[m]aybe a little buzzed.”
Jessica Sneed testified that defendant had been her boyfriend for about six years. On June 16, 2009, she had been with defendant the whole day. While traveling in the white Geo to the parking lot in Ferndale, she was sitting in the back seat, Christopher was driving, and defendant was in the passenger seat. After being contacted by Hynes, “[w]e tried to tell him that Chris was driving and he didn’t really want to listen to us. He wanted to start doing tests on [defendant].”
Sneed further testified that defendant and Christopher have “[k]ind of” similar appearances, although Christopher’s hair is more a “reddish, dirty blond.”
At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the trial court concluded: “In this matter for the purpose of preliminary hearing, there’s a different burden of proof, of course, as compared to jury trial. I think there’s going to be a problem with this case under the burden of reasonable doubt. However, for the purposes of preliminary hearing, there is sufficient evidence to hold the defendant to answer . . . .”
Hearing and Ruling on the Motion to Dismiss
On October 23, 2009, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss the information. The court considered a recorded statement made by defendant after his arrest and while he was being transported to the police station. In the recording, defendant commented to the arresting officers, “I already know I was breaking the law. [¶] . . . [¶] Fucking ten DUI’s. I’m going to hell. . . . Yeah, I know I shouldn’t be driving.” Later, he said, “I don’t know what’s going on. . . .” Still later, he said, Well, . . . this is my fifth DUI. . . . Only I was coming down just for a fucking cigarette. Oh that’s why I’m so pissed. I wanted a fucking cigarette. [¶]. . . [¶] Fucking cigarette. Oh I hate you guys. I hate all people. I can’t believe this — for a fucking cigarette. . . . Oh well. I’ll do the charges. . . . What the fuck was I thinking. I knew I was taking a chance. Not like this. ‘Cause I gotta go to jail.” Defendant then said his girlfriend didn’t have a driver’s license, and also said, “The only reason I was driving is because I know how to drive and she doesn’t.” He also said, “I shouldn’t have been driving without a license.” Finally, he said, “Fucking dumb ass. . . . fucking cigarette. . . . My fucking fifth DUI.”
The court took judicial notice of the files in the perjury cases against Sneed and Christopher.
On September 4, 2009, Humboldt County District Attorney’s Office Investigator Wayne Cox had obtained felony arrest warrants for Sneed and Christopher based on their allegedly perjured testimony—that Christopher, not defendant, was driving on June 16, 2009—at defendant’s preliminary hearing.
Sneed was arrested on September 4, 2009. After advising her of her Miranda rights, Cox interviewed Sneed, who initially “maintained her story that Christopher Crowl, not Rocky Crowl, was the driver of the vehicle.” After being cautioned against the repercussions of lying again, Sneed “began crying and hyperventilating.” She eventually admitted that defendant had been driving and that Christopher had asked her to testify that Christopher was driving. She had agreed to do so because defendant “ ‘doesn’t need a DUI.’ ”
Christopher was arrested on September 7, 2009. On the morning of September 8, Investigator Cox advised Christopher of his Miranda rights and then interviewed him. After Cox said that Sneed had told him the truth and implied that Christopher would go to prison if he continued to claim that he was driving, Christopher said that defendant had been driving earlier, but that he, Christopher, was driving when they pulled into the parking lot behind the liquor store. Because he did not want to go to prison for four years, Christopher eventually admitted that defendant was driving. He said that he had claimed to be driving because it would be defendant’s fifth DUI and he did not want him to have to go to prison. He also said that he, defendant, and Sneed had decided together that Christopher and Sneed would testify that Christopher was driving.
On September 8, 2009, criminal complaints were filed against Sneed and Christopher charging each of them with perjury (Pen. Code, § 118) and being an accessory to a felony (Pen. Code, § 32).
The court also considered at the hearing a series of e-mails between Deputy District Attorney Ben McLaughlin and the office of Sneed’s counsel, over the course of which the Deputy District Attorney insisted that Sneed not plead no contest, but that she plead guilty “under oath,” “with a statement saying that she agreed to say [Christopher] was driving and that her statement to Wayne Cox was true and correct to the best of her recollection. . . . Memories can differ, but it needs to be clear that [defendant] was driving.” When Sneed’s attorney objected to a guilty plea “under oath,” the Deputy District Attorney copied Sneeds’s counsel on an e-mail in which he wrote that the plea offer would likely be withdrawn due to Sneed’s rejection of the offer by refusing to plead guilty under oath.
Both Christopher and Sneed were called to testify at the October 23, 2009 hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss and both asserted their Fifth Amendment right not to testify when asked about the incident that took place on June 16, 2009.
Also at the October 23 hearing, defendant’s father, Gary Crowl, testified that he drove Christopher and Sneed to defendant’s preliminary hearing. They all rode together in the cab of his pickup truck, and he did not hear Christopher and Sneed discuss a plan to lie at the preliminary hearing about who was driving on June 16.
On October 26, 2009, the trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss. In explaining its ruling, the court found the following facts: Between the August 12, 2009 preliminary hearing and September 4, someone in the prosecutor’s office listened to the tape of defendant and the arresting officers and formed an opinion that Sneed and Christopher committed perjury at the preliminary hearing. On September 4, the prosecutor obtained arrest warrants for Sneed and Christopher. At Investigator Cox’s request, Sneed was arrested at about 12:45 p.m. on September 4, and was interviewed by Cox at the jail 45 minutes later, at about 1:30 p.m. The court found that Cox “basically told [Sneed] that she was lying, that she had committed perjury, and that the D.A.’s Office would be able to prove that she had committed perjury, and that the punishment for that was two years, three years, or four years in prison. Miss Sneed was extremely reluctant to change her story, but Investigator Cox was very insistent. He wouldn’t give up. And he tried, basically, everything he could, all of his tactics to get her to change.” Even after Sneed hyperventilated, “Cox went ahead with his insistent questioning” until Sneed admitted she had lied at the preliminary hearing. The court also noted that because she was arrested on the Friday of a three-day weekend, Sneed necessarily remained in jail over the long weekend.
With respect to Christopher, the court noted that he was arrested on Labor Day and interviewed by Cox the next morning at 7:00 a.m., which was “extremely unusual.” Cox used the same techniques and asked the same kinds of questions as he did with Sneed and, again, Christopher “was extremely steadfast in his position, reluctant to change. And after Investigator Cox tried, basically, in my opinion, everything he could think of, he finally got . . . the witness to agree that . . . his testimony had not been true.”
The court observed how unusual prosecution’s conduct was in arresting and questioning Sneed and Christopher for a nonviolent offense. As the court stated: “It is so out of the ordinary. [Cox] wanted to—I think twofold, he wanted to convict the defendant here, Mr. Rocky Crowl, of felony driving under the influence, and he wanted to convict the two witnesses of perjury. And he went to extraordinary lengths—you know—as you compare what’s normally done with what was done in this case.” The court had never seen a so-called Ramey warrant used in “this kind of a case . . . where there’s nothing that critical timewise.” In addition, other than in welfare fraud cases, the court had seen a perjury charge only once in 12 years on the bench, and that was in a murder case where the prosecutor believed a witness lied in court after agreeing to testify truthfully in exchange for a plea agreement in another case.
The court continued: “Clearly, someone in the District Attorney’s Office was very upset at the witnesses for what they believed was perjury, and they were worried that this felony D.U.I. . . . they were afraid this person would walk.” The court believed this fear was based on the prosecution’s knowledge that (1) defendant likely would not testify at trial so that his incriminating statement would not be admissible (assuming the entire recording did not violate Miranda), (2) these two witnesses would be the only defense witnesses, and (3) the magistrate at the preliminary hearing had questioned whether there would be enough evidence to convict defendant. The court further stated that the prosecutor’s office knew there were potential problems with the case because of the “ballpark” resemblance between defendant and Christopher. “And so I think somebody realized this case is in trouble.”
The court then observed that the “net result” of the prosecution’s actions was that Sneed and Christopher would “take the Fifth” at defendant’s trial both because of the pending perjury and accessory after the fact charges and “also, because it doesn’t take a mental genius to realize that if they testified at trial the same way they did at the preliminary hearing they’re gonna be charged additionally with perjury,” given that Cox “had already told them that they’re guilty” and “that it could be proved that they were lying.” The court concluded, after reviewing all of the facts, that defendant’s due process rights were violated.
In terms of a remedy, the court asked whether the People were willing to allow the witnesses’ preliminary hearing testimony to be used at trial, and Deputy District Attorney Ben McLaughlin said no. The court therefore dismissed the charges in this case as well as in pending probation violation matters.
DISCUSSION
I. Violation of Defendant’s Right to Compulsory Process
The People contend the trial court improperly found that the prosecution violated defendant’s constitutional right to compulsory process by charging Christopher Crowl and Jessica Sneed with having committed perjury at defendant’s preliminary hearing.
“The right of an accused to compel witnesses to come into court and give evidence in the accused’s defense is a fundamental one.” (People v. Jacinto (2010) 49 Cal.4th 263, 268 (Jacinto).) The Sixth Amendment provides that “ ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. . . .’ This constitutional guarantee, generally termed the compulsory process clause, applies in both federal and state trials. [Citation.]” (Ibid., quoting Washington v. Texas (1967) 388 U.S. 14, 15, fn. 1.) “Article I, section 15 of the California Constitution similarly guarantees as a matter of state constitutional law that ‘[t]he defendant in a criminal cause has the right . . . to compel attendance of witnesses in the defendant’s behalf. . . .’ [The California Supreme Court], as the final arbiter of the meaning of the California Constitution, has likewise found the state constitutional right to compel the attendance of witnesses a basic component of a fair trial. [Citations.]” (Jacinto, at p. 269.)
As our Supreme Court has explained, “[a] criminal defendant’s rights under the compulsory process clause can be infringed in several ways. ‘They include, for example, statements to defense witnesses to the effect that they would be prosecuted for any crimes they reveal or commit in the course of their testimony. [Citations.] They also include statements to defense witnesses warning they would suffer untoward consequences in other cases if they were to testify on behalf of the defense. [Citations.] Finally, they include arresting a defense witness before he or other defense witnesses have given their testimony.’ [Citation.]” (Jacinto, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 269, quoting In re Martin (1987) 44 Cal.3d 1, 30-31 (Martin); accord, People v. Bryant (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 582, 590.)
To prevail on a claim of interference with the right to present witnesses under the compulsory process clause, a defendant must establish three elements. “First, he must demonstrate prosecutorial misconduct, i.e., conduct that was ‘entirely unnecessary to the proper performance of the prosecutor’s duties and was of such a nature as to transform a defense witness willing to testify into one unwilling to testify.’ [Citations.] [¶] Second, he must ‘establish interference, that is, a causal link between the prosecutorial misconduct and the defendant’s inability to present the witness.’ [Citations.] In this regard, the [defendant] is ‘not required to prove that the conduct under challenge was the “direct or exclusive” cause. [Citations.] Rather, he need only show that the conduct was a substantial cause. [Citations.] The misconduct in question may be deemed a substantial cause when, for example, it carries significant coercive force [citation] and is soon followed by the witness’s refusal to testify [citation].’ [Citation.]” (In re Williams (1994) 7 Cal.4th 572, 603 (Williams), quoting, inter alia, Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 31; accord, Jacinto, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 269-270.) “ ‘Finally, the defendant must show the testimony he was unable to present was material to his defense.’ [Citations.]” (Jacinto, at p. 270.)
In the present case, the People primarily address the first element—prosecutorial misconduct—in arguing that defendant’s due process right to compulsory process was not violated, but briefly argue, in addition, that defendant was not deprived of the opportunity to present meaningful evidence.
A. Prosecutorial Misconduct
According to the People, “courts do not find misconduct because a prosecutor charged a witness with perjury after the witness has committed that offense. Such action differs materially from a prosecutor’s threats to a witness about anticipated testimony. It is entirely within the proper performance of a prosecutor’s duties to investigate and charge a completed crime.” Thus, they continue, the arrest, interrogation, and filing of charges against the two witnesses in this case amounted to conduct that was not “ ‘entirely unnecessary to the proper performance of the prosecutor’s duties’ ” (Williams supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 603) and, therefore, the trial court’s finding of prosecutorial misconduct cannot be sustained.
In support of this argument, the People rely on Williams, supra, 7 Cal.4th 572 and Jacinto, supra, 49 Cal.4th 263. In Williams, our Supreme Court held, in habeas corpus proceedings, that the prosecution did not interfere with the petitioner’s right to present witnesses when it, inter alia, (1) indicted and arrested one defense witness for perjury in past cases two days before the petitioner’s evidentiary hearing on his habeas petition was scheduled to begin, and (2) indicted another defense witness for perjury some months before the hearing was to take place. (Williams, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 605-606.) With respect to the first witness, the record reflected that he had informed the prosecutor, well before his indictment, that his statement in a prior declaration that another witness had lied at the petitioner’s trial was itself a lie and, further, that he would so-testify at the petitioner’s hearing. (Ibid.) Based on these facts, the court concluded that, despite the timing of the witness’s indictment and arrest and his refusal to testify at the hearing, the petitioner had failed to show how the government’s conduct in arresting the witness for perjury “was wholly unnecessary to the performance of its duties and was of such a character as to transform [the witness] from a willing witness to one who refused to testify.” (Id. at p. 606.)
As to the second witness, the record showed that he was indicted for perjury months before the petitioner’s evidentiary hearing was set to begin. (Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 606.) The court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the purpose of the indictment was to intimidate the witness and keep him from testifying, given that the evidence showed that the prosecution was not apprised that the witness was a possible witness at the defendant’s hearing until eight months after his indictment. (Ibid.)
Thus, in Williams, the evidence affirmatively showed that the government had not indicted the two witnesses to force them or other witnesses to invoke their Fifth Amendment rights at the petitioner’s evidentiary hearing. The Williams court did not address whether arresting defense witnesses for perjury before a defendant’s trial in the distinct circumstances presented here could constitute interference with that defendant’s right to present witnesses.
In Jacinto, supra, 49 Cal.4th 263, 269, the defendant claimed that the prosecution had violated his compulsory process rights when the sheriff released a defense eyewitness, following his release from jail, to federal immigration officials, “knowing he would most likely be deported and thus unavailable to testify on defendant’s behalf.” Our Supreme Court found that the defendant had not satisfied the first element necessary to demonstrate such a violation: prosecutorial misconduct. First, it was the sheriff—acting independently and not at the prosecutor’s behest—who released the witness to immigration officials, and the sheriff’s acts could not be attributed to the prosecution. (Id. at pp. 270-271.) Second, even if the sheriff could be characterized as a member of the prosecution team, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had issued a federal immigration detainer for the witness once he was released from jail and, as the court observed, “The federal government’s power over immigration issues is supreme. [Citations.] Faced with an immigration detainer from ICE, the sheriff and his employees properly complied, as a matter of comity, by releasing [the witness] to ICE’s custody.” (Id. at pp. 272-273.) Third, the court observed that the defendant “was not powerless to ensure that [the witness] would appear at his trial,” given that there were procedures potentially available to the defendant to make certain the witness could testify, either in person or by deposition. (Id. at pp. 273-274.)
Jacinto thus is factually distinguishable from the present case in several ways and does not provide support for the People’s generalized argument that “the prosecutor does not commit misconduct when he engages in conduct that is legally permissible or authorized, even though that conduct ultimately results in the loss of a material defense witness.”
The California Supreme Court’s analysis in Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1 is more relevant to our inquiry than the cases cited by the People. In Martin, a prosecution investigator arrested Stephen Aguilar, the first defense witness to testify at the petitioner’s trial, just outside the courtroom in the presence of people the investigator knew to be defense witnesses who had not yet testified, immediately after Aguilar gave testimony that contradicted that of the prosecution’s key witness. (Id. at p. 33.) At the time of the arrest, the investigator saw no sign that Aguilar was going to flee. (Id. at p. 34.) In an opinion granting the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, our Supreme Court found that although there was no direct contemporaneous evidence of prosecutorial interference with the petitioner’s constitutional right to present the testimony of witnesses at trial, this evidence, along with evidence that another defense witness subsequently invoked his Fifth Amendment rights and refused to testify on the petitioner’s behalf, constituted circumstantial evidence from which the existence of such misconduct could be inferred. (Id. at pp. 33-34.)
The Attorney General also argued in Martin “that the arrest of Aguilar was proper as a constitutionally reasonable seizure of the person and as such was proper insofar as petitioner’s compulsory-process rights were concerned.” (Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 35.) The court rejected this argument, explaining that it does not follow that government conduct that does not violate the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures necessarily does not violate the Sixth Amendment’s recognition of a defendant’s right to present evidence on his own behalf. (Ibid.) The court concluded: “It is clear to us that the prosecution committed misconduct under the Sixth Amendment in arresting Aguilar when and where it did: [the investigator] engaged in activity that was completely unnecessary under the circumstances—he was under no legal or practical compulsion to make the arrest in the presence of defense witnesses and the press—and was of such a character as ‘to transform [a defense witness] from a willing witness to one who would refuse to testify’ [Citation].” (Ibid.)
Likewise, in the present case, simply because the District Attorney’s Office is authorized to arrest, interrogate, and charge people suspected of committing crimes, including perjury, does not mean it has carte blanche to engage in activity apparently designed to—and certainly with the effect of—undermining a defendant’s right to compulsory process. As in Martin, even assuming the prosecution’s conduct was otherwise proper, the timing and manner of the arrest, interrogation, and perjury charges filed against Christopher and Sneed were “completely unnecessary under the circumstances,” as was the use of a Ramey warrant, and support the inference that the prosecution interfered with defendant’s constitutional right to present the testimony of witnesses at trial. (Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 33, 35.)
Similarly, in Bryant, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d 582, 588-589, the sole non-police witness to the defendant’s traffic stop was arrested for perjury allegedly committed at defendant’s preliminary hearing. The witness subsequently refused to testify at defendant’s probation revocation hearing only after the prosecutor warned the witness that he would be facing another count of perjury if he testified consistently with his preliminary hearing testimony. (Ibid.) The appellate court held that the government’s coercive action caused this material witness to become unavailable, thereby violating the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial. (Id. at p. 588.)
Here, as the trial court stated, given the nature of the prosecution’s conduct, Sneed and Christopher plainly did not need to be reminded of the pending charges and the potential for additional charges to be filed before they exercised their Fifth Amendment rights.
In addition, as the trial court found at the hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss, the evidence in the record regarding the prosecution’s conduct raises a red flag regarding the motive for this highly unusual conduct. Moreover, regardless of motive, these actions are circumstantial evidence of misconduct, given that it is “difficult to imagine” that the prosecution’s conduct would not have intimidated both witnesses. (Bray v. Peyton, supra, 429 F.2d at p. 501; see also Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 33-34.) The trial court observed that the “net result” of the prosecution’s actions was that both witnesses would invoke their Fifth Amendment rights at defendant’s trial, as they did at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, because of the pending charges against them as well as “because it doesn’t take a mental genius to realize that if they testified at trial the same way they did at the preliminary hearing they’re gonna be charged additionally with perjury.” (Cf. Bryant, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at pp. 588-589.)
For these reasons, we reject the People’s central argument: that, because there was probable cause to arrest the two witnesses for perjury, the prosecution’s conduct cannot be considered “ ‘entirely unnecessary to the proper performance of the prosecutor’s duties.’ ” (Williams, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 603.) On the contrary, as we have explained and as Martin makes clear, this extraordinary rush to first obtain a Ramey warrant, and then to arrest, insistently interrogate, and charge these two defense witnesses with the commission of nonviolent crimes was “completely unnecessary under the circumstances” given that Cox was “under no legal or practical compulsion” to take these actions when and in the manner he did. (Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 35.) Accordingly, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Cox’s conduct on behalf of the District Attorney’s Office “was of such a character as ‘to transform [each of the two witnesses] from a willing witness to one who would refuse to testify,’ ” and therefore constituted prosecutorial misconduct. (Ibid.)
Finally, the People argue that “[a]dopting a rule that the prosecutor must delay filing a legally authorized criminal complaint against a potential defense witness until that witness has testified at defendant’s trial presents significant difficulties for the prosecutor,” including challenges related to statutes of limitations, motions for dismissal based on pre-accusation delay, and potential loss of evidence. (See People v. Pearson (Mich.App. 1975) 232 N.W.2d 408, 410 affd. in part and revd. in part in People v. Pearson (Mich. 1979) 273 N.W.2d 856 [Michigan Court of Appeal refused to “place the stamp of judicial approval upon requiring prosecuting attorneys to delay for an indeterminate time the filing of charges because an accused is a witness in a separate case”].) We adopt no such rule here. Rather, we simply conclude, in the particular circumstances of this case, that the evidence in the record supports the trial court’s finding that the prosecution’s unnecessary urgency in arresting, forcefully interrogating, and filing perjury and accessory after the fact charges against Sneed and Christopher resulted in effectively precluding these previously willing defense witnesses from testifying at defendant’s trial. This was misconduct.
B. Materiality
The People claim that the record does not support a finding that Sneed and Christopher’s testimony would have been material and favorable to defendant’s defense because perjured testimony is not material testimony.
We conclude that the People have forfeited this issue on appeal because they expressly conceded in the trial court that the two witnesses’ testimony was material to the defense. (Cf., e.g., People v. Miller (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 545, 551 [where District Attorney expressly conceded lack of probable cause for search, Attorney General could not justify search on that ground on appeal].)
To “demonstrate ‘materiality,’ ” the defendant “ ‘must at least make some plausible showing of how [the] testimony [of the witness] would have been both material and favorable to his defense.’ [Citation.]” (Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 32, quoting United States v. Valenzuela Bernal (1982) 458 U.S. 858, 867.)
In any event, Sneed’s and Christopher’s expected testimony plainly was material. The truth of the perjury allegations had not been adjudicated at the time of the court’s ruling on defendant’s motion to dismiss, and the witnesses had never testified differently under oath.
The court’s mere acknowledgement that these witnesses may have committed perjury does not constitute an adjudication that they in fact did so. (See Bryant, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 592, fn. 5 [“It is not the court nor the prosecuting attorney’s function to attempt to purge the court of a witness who might possibly offer perjured testimony. . . . Thus, the believability of the witness’ testimony goes to its weight not its admissibility”]; compare People v. Harbolt (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 140, 155 [where potential witness stated under oath that he had not committed crimes with which defendant was charged, materiality of his testimony was not demonstrated]; U.S. v. Williams (2d Cir. 2000) 205 F.3d 23, 30 [where trial court had found credible defense witness’s testimony at defendant’s second trial in which he recanted testimony presented at first trial, materiality was not shown].)
As the trial court explained when it ruled on the motion to dismiss, it was unlikely that defendant would testify, in light of the incriminating statements he made to police. Hence, “[y]ou take out the defendant and you take out the two defense witnesses, that’s what you’re left with[, the police officer’s story that defendant was the driver]. It would be a pretty short trial.” The record supports the trial court’s finding that Sneed and Christopher’s testimony “ ‘would have been both material and favorable to [defendant’s] defense.’ ” (Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 32.)
In sum, the trial court’s conclusion that the prosecution in this case violated defendant’s constitutional right to compulsory process is adequately supported by the record. (See, e.g., People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 472.)
II. Remedy
The People contend that, even if there was a constitutional violation, the trial court’s dismissal of the information was an abuse of discretion because a lesser sanction would have adequately protected defendant’s right to a fair trial.
Specifically, the People assert that the court could have used Sneed’s and Christopher’s preliminary hearing testimony, which would have allowed defendant to present his defense at trial despite the witnesses’ unavailability. In support of this argument they cite Evidence Code section 1291, which provides in relevant part: “(a) Evidence of former testimony is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) The party against whom the former testimony is offered was a party to the action or proceeding in which the testimony was given and had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that which he has at the hearing.” (Cf. People v. Conrad (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1175, 1186 [in context of evidence lost due to prosecutorial delay, trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed action even though an intermediate remedy was available that would have mitigated prejudice resulting from delay]; cf. People v. Woods (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 929, 937-939 [in affirming judgment of conviction following jury trial, appellate court held that defendant could not prove testimony of witnesses made unavailable due to prosecutorial misconduct was material since all of witness’ proposed testimony was presented to jury in other ways].)
We conclude that the People are precluded from arguing that the court’s dismissal of the information constituted an abuse of discretion in the circumstances of this case due to their active involvement in bringing about the dismissal. Their refusal to stipulate to the admissibility of the preliminary hearing transcript at trial invited the alleged error of which they now complain. (See, e.g., People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 549-550, fn. 3 [“The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error when ‘his own conduct induces the commission of error’ ”].)
Moreover, even if the People’s refusal to stipulate did not technically constitute invited error, they have forfeited the issue on appeal by failing to raise it in the trial court. (See, e.g., People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 590 [“ ‘ “[I]t is unfair to the trial judge and to the adverse party to take advantage of an error on appeal when it could easily have been corrected at the trial” ’ ”].) The prosecutor made a tactical decision at the hearing on the motion to dismiss to, in essence, “object” to the admissibility of the preliminary hearing transcript at trial by refusing to stipulate to its admission, thereby preserving its right to appeal the trial court’s substantive ruling and the consequent dismissal. It would be eminently unfair to permit the People to now argue on appeal that the court abused its discretion in refusing to let the case go forward using the preliminary hearing transcript after they refused to stipulate to the preliminary hearing testimony’s admission, and then failed to argue to the trial court that it was nonetheless admissible under Evidence Code section 1291, subdivision (a)(2). (Cf., e.g., People v. Miller, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 551 [where prosecution could have pursued two arguments simultaneously in trial court, but chose not to do so, “[f]airness dictates the prosecution accept the consequences of its decision”]; People v. Middleton (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 732, 737, fn. 2, quoting Steagald v. United States (1981) 451 U.S. 204, 209 [“the prosecution may lose the opportunity to challenge a defendant’s standing to appeal ‘when it has acquiesced in contrary findings by [the trial court] or when it has failed to raise such questions in a timely fashion during the litigation’ ”].)
We therefore conclude that the People’s actions in the trial court preclude them from now arguing that the trial court’s decision to dismiss the information in this case constituted an abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order dismissing the information in this matter is affirmed. The Clerk/Administrator of this Court is directed to forward a copy of this opinion to the California State Bar for review and further proceeding, if appropriate.
_________________________
Kline, P.J.
We concur:
_________________________
Haerle, J.
_________________________
Lambden, J.
These facts are taken from the testimony presented at the preliminary hearing, held on August 12, 2009.
Hynes later found a six- or twelve-pack of beer and a pack of cigarettes in the causeway. Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
For example, in his questioning of both witnesses, Cox falsely told Sneed and hinted to Christopher that the car, with defendant driving, had been captured on videotape by a surveillance camera. He also told them that they could mitigate how much trouble they were in by admitting that defendant was driving.
People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263; now codified at Penal Code section 817. When there is probable cause to arrest an individual, police may obtain a Ramey warrant to arrest that person in his or her home before criminal charges are filed. (See, e.g., (Goodwin v. Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 215, 218.) As the trial court noted, such a procedure is used infrequently, primarily in situations in which it is critical to arrest a suspect immediately.
Deputy District Attorney Ben McLaughlin, who appeared on behalf of the District Attorney’s Office at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, stated at the hearing and in his written opposition to the motion that, following the preliminary hearing, Deputy District Attorney Randy Mailman listened to the recording of defendant’s statements to the arresting officers, and “acted within her purview as a deputy district attorney to have charges investigated that she thought were sustainable. She received information pursuant to the investigation. The D.A.’s Office acted on that information.”
In ruling that dismissal of the charges was necessary, the court stated that it did not like this result because, if defendant had in fact been driving while under the influence, he should be punished for it. It also commented: “And it’s also the case that the witnesses here that we’re talking about very well may have committed perjury. There’s evidence to suggest that that’s true. And what’s gonna happen in those cases, I don’t know. But the situation is that the law has to apply equally no matter what kind of a case it is. . . .”
The parties seem uncertain about the applicable standard of review for a claim alleging violation of the right to compulsory process. While the cases generally do not explicitly discuss the standard of review, most appear to be applying the substantial evidence standard. (See, e.g., People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 472 [“We find the trial court’s conclusions adequately supported by the record”].) We adhere to that approach in this opinion, although we also conclude that the result would be the same utilizing either the substantial evidence or abuse of discretion standard of review.
The People do not argue that the causation element was not satisfied in this case, and we agree with their implicit admission that the causation element was in fact satisfied. (See Williams, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 603.)
The court also rejected the claim of prosecutorial misconduct as to three other witnesses who invoked their Fifth amendment rights at the petitioner’s evidentiary hearing. The court found that the petitioner had not established misconduct since there was no evidence that the indictments of the other two witnesses (see text, ante) “were unnecessary to the performance of the prosecution’s duties.” (Williams, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 607.) Contrary to the People’s interpretation, the court’s conclusion simply reflects, in light of the fact that the indictments of the other two witnesses did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct, that any intimidation other potential witnesses felt could not constitute prosecutorial misconduct based on those indictments.
Indeed, it would seem that if the Williams court believed that a defense witness’s perjury arrest or indictment prior to testifying at a defendant’s trial could never constitute prosecutorial misconduct, it would not have needed to go through the analysis it did before concluding that there had been no interference with the defendant’s compulsory process rights under the particular facts of the case.
The Martin court observed that it had come to the same conclusion as the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bray v. Peyton (4th Cir. 1970) 429 F.2d 500, 501, which held that the prosecution committed misconduct when it arrested a defense witness during trial, before he had testified, finding it “ ‘difficult to imagine’ ” that the incident would not intimidate both the witness who was arrested as well as other defense witnesses. (Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 35.)
In People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 458, which distinguished Martin and is similarly distinguishable from the present case, our Supreme Court found that there was no “evidence the witness was arrested in connection with this case or that his arrest on an unrelated warrant was engineered by the prosecutor, or indeed, that the prosecutor even knew about it. Thus the case is not like [Martin] in which we said the prosecutor acted improperly in causing a defense witness to be arrested as he left the stand, in an evident effort to intimidate him and prevent further testimony. [Citation.]”
The People assert that the trial court’s opinion that the extraordinary measures taken in this case reflect a goal of subverting defense testimony does not constitute substantial evidence of improper motives. They then go on to discuss the evidence of perjury supporting their conduct. First, a finding of improper motives is not necessary to our analysis. (See Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 31.) Second, neither the trial court nor this court need blind ourselves to the fact that perjury is committed regularly in our courtrooms but, nevertheless, perjury prosecutions are extremely rare. We need not ignore the clear inference that the nearly unheard of conduct by the prosecution in this case was designed to intimidate these witnesses and keep them from testifying for defendant. Third, the evidence of perjury was by no means overwhelming in this case. As the magistrate presiding over the preliminary hearing noted at the conclusion of that hearing: “I think there’s going to be a problem with this case under the burden of reasonable doubt.” Moreover, at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial court noted that the prosecution knew “there were some potential problems with the case because, arguably, [defendant], who is cousins with the witness Christopher Crowl, there was at least some resemblance—that could be arguable as to how much—but they were in the ballpark of looking like each other. And so I think somebody realized this case is in trouble.” Indeed, this was a case of conflicting evidence and witnesses, a classic case for a jury trial. (See Bryant, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 592, fn. 5, quoting Rosen v. United States (1918) 245 U.S. 467, 471 [discussing “ ‘the conviction of our time that the truth is more likely to be arrived at by hearing the testimony of all persons of competent understanding who may seem to have knowledge of the facts involved in a case, leaving the credit and weight of such testimony to be determined by the jury’ ”].)
In this regard, it is notable that the District Attorney’s Office insisted that Sneed plead guilty under oath, with a statement making clear that defendant was driving.
In their reply brief, the People argue for the first time that the trial court did not find that the action was “ ‘wholly unnecessary’ to the proper performance of the prosecutor’s duties,” and that, therefore, its ruling must have rested on a misunderstanding of the relevant law and cannot be upheld. Even were we to address this tardily raised point (see People v. Adams (1990) 216 Cal.App.3d 1431, 1441, fn. 2) [issues raised for first time in reply brief generally will not be considered on appeal]), we do not agree that the court’s failure to use particular language in making its ruling undermines its thoughtful, thorough analysis.
Because we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that prosecutorial misconduct occurred in this case, we are obligated to notify the State Bar of that misconduct with respect to the actions of Deputy District Attorney Ben McLaughlin and/or Deputy District Attorney Randy Mailman. (See Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6086.7, subd. (a)(2) [“[a] court shall notify the State Bar . . . “[w]henever a modification or reversal of a judgment in a judicial proceeding is based in whole or in part on the misconduct . . . of an attorney”].) Although subdivision (a)(2) of section 6086.7 states that such notification must be made upon “modification or reversal” of a judgment, we do not interpret the statute as relieving us of our reporting obligation merely because the trial court found the misconduct before we did.
The People assert that the prosecutor could not ethically stipulate to admission of testimony he believed was perjured. They cite People v. Jennings (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 899, 907, in which the appellate court stated that “a defense attorney has an ethical obligation not to present perjured testimony.” First, we are doubtful that entering into a stipulation in the circumstances of this case would constitute the People’s “presentation” of perjured testimony as discussed in People v. Jennings. Second, there is something unsettling about the People arguing here that in the trial court they could not have ethically agreed to the testimony’s admission at trial while now strenuously arguing that the trial court erred when it dismissed the information rather than finding that same testimony admissible at trial.
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UPDATE: 4/25/11
◼ If Gallegos makes a list of law enforcement officers with ethics problems, does he have to put himself on it? - Humboldt Mirror
◼ link
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ROCKY CROWL, Defendant and Respondent.
A127221 (Humboldt County Super. Ct. No. CR093710)
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND DENYING REHEARING [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the unpublished opinion filed herein on March 29, 2011, be modified as follows:
On page 1, in the caption, the appellate designations for the parties should be reversed, see above and as follows: “The People, Plaintiff and Appellant, vs. Rocky Crowl, Defendant and Respondent.”
On page 6, in the first sentence of the second full paragraph, add the following parenthetical as follows: “The court also considered at the hearing a series of e-mails between Deputy District Attorney Ben McLaughlin (who apparently was the prosecutor assigned to try defendant’s case) and the office of Sneed’s counsel, . . . ”
On page 8, add the following five sentences to the end of footnote 6: “McLaughlin further stated at the hearing, ‘Miss Mailman after reviewing audio tape thought there might be probable cause to suspect perjury had occurred. A warrant was prepared, and a judge reviewed the warrant.’ McLaughlin also stated that, after the interviews with Sneed and Christopher, ‘Mr. Cox prepared a report, submitted the report to [Assistant District Attorney Wes] Keat. Mr. Keat makes the charging decisions. Reports for charges were filed.’ ”
On page 18, footnote 17 should be changed to read as follows: “Because we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that prosecutorial misconduct occurred in this case, we are obligated to notify the State Bar of that misconduct. The record suggests that one or more of the following attorneys from the District Attorney’s Office were involved in the misconduct in question: Deputy District Attorney Ben McLaughlin, Deputy District Attorney Randy Mailman, and/or Assistant District Attorney Wes Keat. However, that will be for the State Bar to determine. (See Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6086.7, subd. (a)(2) [‘[a] court shall notify the State Bar . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [w]henever a modification or reversal of a judgment in a judicial proceeding is based in whole or in part on the misconduct . . . of an attorney’].) Although subdivision (a)(2) of section 6086.7 states that such notification must be made upon ‘modification or reversal’ of a judgment, we do not interpret the statute as relieving us of our reporting obligation merely because the trial court found the misconduct before we did.”
There is no change in the judgment.
Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied.
Dated: ___________________________
____________________________P.J.
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◼ Mar 29, 2011 ... The People appeal after the trial court granted the motion of Rocky Crowl ( defendant) to dismiss the information on the ground that the ...
www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/nonpub/A127221.DOC
Filed 3/29/11 P. v. Crowl CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ROCKY CROWL, Defendant and Appellant.
A127221 (Humboldt County Super. Ct. No. CR093710)
The People appeal after the trial court granted the motion of Rocky Crowl (defendant) to dismiss the information on the ground that the prosecution violated his constitutional right to compulsory process by intimidating defense witnesses. On appeal, the People contend the prosecution did not violate defendant’s right to compulsory process by charging two defense witnesses with having committed perjury at defendant’s preliminary hearing. We shall affirm the trial court’s order dismissing the information.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant was charged by information with driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)—count one); driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 or more (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)—count two), with the further allegation that his blood alcohol level exceeded .15 percent (Veh. Code, § 23578); and driving on a suspended or revoked license (Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a)—count three). It was further alleged as to counts one and two that defendant had committed an alcohol-related driving offense within the past 10 years (Veh. Code, § 23550), and as to count three that defendant had suffered a prior conviction for driving with a suspended or revoked license (Veh. Code, § 14601.5, subd. (a)).
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the information on the ground that the prosecutor had committed misconduct by dissuading defense witnesses from testifying. Following a hearing, on October 26, 2009, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the information.
On December 22, 2009, the People filed a notice of appeal.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Charged Offenses
Ferndale Police Officer Jason Hynes testified that, on June 16, 2009, at around 4:35 p.m., he saw a small, white car stall near the intersection of Main Street and Shaw Avenue in Ferndale; he was about 80 feet away from the stalled vehicle. The car, which was missing its front and rear windshields as well as its side rear windows, was splattered with blue paint, and had a hood that was about to fall off, started up again and passed within about 20 feet of where he stood. He saw three occupants inside the car. The driver had short dark hair and dark facial hair. The male passenger in the front seat was lighter skinned and had short light hair and facial hair. The female in the right rear passenger seat had dirty blond or light brown hair. The car was driving at the speed limit and was not swerving, but the absence of a windshield drew his attention.
Hynes saw the vehicle turn into a city parking lot. He wanted to investigate, so he went back to the Ferndale Police Department to get another officer to accompany him. About five minutes later, Hynes drove to the parking lot with Officer Frank. He saw the car, but there was no one inside. The officers started to look for the three people he had seen in the car and, about two minutes later, he saw them come around a corner. He recognized the man he had seen driving the car; he later identified the man as defendant. Defendant briefly ducked into a causeway, and then came back out. After contacting defendant, Hynes observed signs that he was intoxicated, including a stalling walk, the smell of alcohol, red and watery eyes, and slurred speech.
While Hynes was talking to defendant, the other two people, defendant’s girlfriend, Jessica Sneed, and his cousin, Christopher Crowl (Christopher), were five or more feet away. They did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Hynes said he had seen defendant driving, and defendant stated that he had been driving. Defendant said he came to Ferndale to buy cigarettes and told Hynes that he had drunk five beers earlier in the day. Sneed said defendant had consumed about four beers. At some point, Christopher asked, “What if I was driving?”
Hynes then conducted several field sobriety tests on defendant, which demonstrated a high level of intoxication. Defendant refused to take a final “walk and turn” test, telling Hynes to take him to jail. Hynes then arrested defendant. After Hynes placed defendant in the patrol car, defendant became combative; he yelled, swore, and banged his head on the rear seat. Once at the police station, defendant was a bit calmer, but still exploded at times. He told Hynes that “he would not stop. He would continue to drink and drive.” A breathalyzer (“EPAS”) test administered at the police station registered a blood-alcohol level of .245 percent.
Hynes acknowledged that both at the time of the incident and at the hearing, Christopher’s hair and facial hair lengths were similar to defendant’s hair and facial hair lengths. He also acknowledged that the two men were roughly similar in build.
Christopher testified that defendant is his cousin. On the day that defendant was arrested, Christopher, defendant, and defendant’s girlfriend had driven from a friend’s house in Loleta to Ferndale in a little white Geo automobile that they had borrowed from another cousin.
Christopher drove the car from Loleta to Ferndale and into the city parking lot. The three of them then went into a liquor store. When they came back outside, a police officer made contact with them and began to question defendant. During that conversation, Christopher told the officer that he had been driving the car. The officer said to “shut up, I was lying and I wasn’t drunk. Shut up and stay out of it.”
Christopher testified that his and defendant’s hair and beard lengths were pretty similar and that they are about the same height; defendant is a couple of years older than Christopher. He described defendant’s hair color as “blondish brown” or “light brown,” and his own hair color as “dark blond.”
On cross-examination, Christopher acknowledged that he knew that defendant had some prior DUI convictions. He thought defendant had drunk a beer or two that day and was “[m]aybe a little buzzed.”
Jessica Sneed testified that defendant had been her boyfriend for about six years. On June 16, 2009, she had been with defendant the whole day. While traveling in the white Geo to the parking lot in Ferndale, she was sitting in the back seat, Christopher was driving, and defendant was in the passenger seat. After being contacted by Hynes, “[w]e tried to tell him that Chris was driving and he didn’t really want to listen to us. He wanted to start doing tests on [defendant].”
Sneed further testified that defendant and Christopher have “[k]ind of” similar appearances, although Christopher’s hair is more a “reddish, dirty blond.”
At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the trial court concluded: “In this matter for the purpose of preliminary hearing, there’s a different burden of proof, of course, as compared to jury trial. I think there’s going to be a problem with this case under the burden of reasonable doubt. However, for the purposes of preliminary hearing, there is sufficient evidence to hold the defendant to answer . . . .”
Hearing and Ruling on the Motion to Dismiss
On October 23, 2009, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss the information. The court considered a recorded statement made by defendant after his arrest and while he was being transported to the police station. In the recording, defendant commented to the arresting officers, “I already know I was breaking the law. [¶] . . . [¶] Fucking ten DUI’s. I’m going to hell. . . . Yeah, I know I shouldn’t be driving.” Later, he said, “I don’t know what’s going on. . . .” Still later, he said, Well, . . . this is my fifth DUI. . . . Only I was coming down just for a fucking cigarette. Oh that’s why I’m so pissed. I wanted a fucking cigarette. [¶]. . . [¶] Fucking cigarette. Oh I hate you guys. I hate all people. I can’t believe this — for a fucking cigarette. . . . Oh well. I’ll do the charges. . . . What the fuck was I thinking. I knew I was taking a chance. Not like this. ‘Cause I gotta go to jail.” Defendant then said his girlfriend didn’t have a driver’s license, and also said, “The only reason I was driving is because I know how to drive and she doesn’t.” He also said, “I shouldn’t have been driving without a license.” Finally, he said, “Fucking dumb ass. . . . fucking cigarette. . . . My fucking fifth DUI.”
The court took judicial notice of the files in the perjury cases against Sneed and Christopher.
On September 4, 2009, Humboldt County District Attorney’s Office Investigator Wayne Cox had obtained felony arrest warrants for Sneed and Christopher based on their allegedly perjured testimony—that Christopher, not defendant, was driving on June 16, 2009—at defendant’s preliminary hearing.
Sneed was arrested on September 4, 2009. After advising her of her Miranda rights, Cox interviewed Sneed, who initially “maintained her story that Christopher Crowl, not Rocky Crowl, was the driver of the vehicle.” After being cautioned against the repercussions of lying again, Sneed “began crying and hyperventilating.” She eventually admitted that defendant had been driving and that Christopher had asked her to testify that Christopher was driving. She had agreed to do so because defendant “ ‘doesn’t need a DUI.’ ”
Christopher was arrested on September 7, 2009. On the morning of September 8, Investigator Cox advised Christopher of his Miranda rights and then interviewed him. After Cox said that Sneed had told him the truth and implied that Christopher would go to prison if he continued to claim that he was driving, Christopher said that defendant had been driving earlier, but that he, Christopher, was driving when they pulled into the parking lot behind the liquor store. Because he did not want to go to prison for four years, Christopher eventually admitted that defendant was driving. He said that he had claimed to be driving because it would be defendant’s fifth DUI and he did not want him to have to go to prison. He also said that he, defendant, and Sneed had decided together that Christopher and Sneed would testify that Christopher was driving.
On September 8, 2009, criminal complaints were filed against Sneed and Christopher charging each of them with perjury (Pen. Code, § 118) and being an accessory to a felony (Pen. Code, § 32).
The court also considered at the hearing a series of e-mails between Deputy District Attorney Ben McLaughlin and the office of Sneed’s counsel, over the course of which the Deputy District Attorney insisted that Sneed not plead no contest, but that she plead guilty “under oath,” “with a statement saying that she agreed to say [Christopher] was driving and that her statement to Wayne Cox was true and correct to the best of her recollection. . . . Memories can differ, but it needs to be clear that [defendant] was driving.” When Sneed’s attorney objected to a guilty plea “under oath,” the Deputy District Attorney copied Sneeds’s counsel on an e-mail in which he wrote that the plea offer would likely be withdrawn due to Sneed’s rejection of the offer by refusing to plead guilty under oath.
Both Christopher and Sneed were called to testify at the October 23, 2009 hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss and both asserted their Fifth Amendment right not to testify when asked about the incident that took place on June 16, 2009.
Also at the October 23 hearing, defendant’s father, Gary Crowl, testified that he drove Christopher and Sneed to defendant’s preliminary hearing. They all rode together in the cab of his pickup truck, and he did not hear Christopher and Sneed discuss a plan to lie at the preliminary hearing about who was driving on June 16.
On October 26, 2009, the trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss. In explaining its ruling, the court found the following facts: Between the August 12, 2009 preliminary hearing and September 4, someone in the prosecutor’s office listened to the tape of defendant and the arresting officers and formed an opinion that Sneed and Christopher committed perjury at the preliminary hearing. On September 4, the prosecutor obtained arrest warrants for Sneed and Christopher. At Investigator Cox’s request, Sneed was arrested at about 12:45 p.m. on September 4, and was interviewed by Cox at the jail 45 minutes later, at about 1:30 p.m. The court found that Cox “basically told [Sneed] that she was lying, that she had committed perjury, and that the D.A.’s Office would be able to prove that she had committed perjury, and that the punishment for that was two years, three years, or four years in prison. Miss Sneed was extremely reluctant to change her story, but Investigator Cox was very insistent. He wouldn’t give up. And he tried, basically, everything he could, all of his tactics to get her to change.” Even after Sneed hyperventilated, “Cox went ahead with his insistent questioning” until Sneed admitted she had lied at the preliminary hearing. The court also noted that because she was arrested on the Friday of a three-day weekend, Sneed necessarily remained in jail over the long weekend.
With respect to Christopher, the court noted that he was arrested on Labor Day and interviewed by Cox the next morning at 7:00 a.m., which was “extremely unusual.” Cox used the same techniques and asked the same kinds of questions as he did with Sneed and, again, Christopher “was extremely steadfast in his position, reluctant to change. And after Investigator Cox tried, basically, in my opinion, everything he could think of, he finally got . . . the witness to agree that . . . his testimony had not been true.”
The court observed how unusual prosecution’s conduct was in arresting and questioning Sneed and Christopher for a nonviolent offense. As the court stated: “It is so out of the ordinary. [Cox] wanted to—I think twofold, he wanted to convict the defendant here, Mr. Rocky Crowl, of felony driving under the influence, and he wanted to convict the two witnesses of perjury. And he went to extraordinary lengths—you know—as you compare what’s normally done with what was done in this case.” The court had never seen a so-called Ramey warrant used in “this kind of a case . . . where there’s nothing that critical timewise.” In addition, other than in welfare fraud cases, the court had seen a perjury charge only once in 12 years on the bench, and that was in a murder case where the prosecutor believed a witness lied in court after agreeing to testify truthfully in exchange for a plea agreement in another case.
The court continued: “Clearly, someone in the District Attorney’s Office was very upset at the witnesses for what they believed was perjury, and they were worried that this felony D.U.I. . . . they were afraid this person would walk.” The court believed this fear was based on the prosecution’s knowledge that (1) defendant likely would not testify at trial so that his incriminating statement would not be admissible (assuming the entire recording did not violate Miranda), (2) these two witnesses would be the only defense witnesses, and (3) the magistrate at the preliminary hearing had questioned whether there would be enough evidence to convict defendant. The court further stated that the prosecutor’s office knew there were potential problems with the case because of the “ballpark” resemblance between defendant and Christopher. “And so I think somebody realized this case is in trouble.”
The court then observed that the “net result” of the prosecution’s actions was that Sneed and Christopher would “take the Fifth” at defendant’s trial both because of the pending perjury and accessory after the fact charges and “also, because it doesn’t take a mental genius to realize that if they testified at trial the same way they did at the preliminary hearing they’re gonna be charged additionally with perjury,” given that Cox “had already told them that they’re guilty” and “that it could be proved that they were lying.” The court concluded, after reviewing all of the facts, that defendant’s due process rights were violated.
In terms of a remedy, the court asked whether the People were willing to allow the witnesses’ preliminary hearing testimony to be used at trial, and Deputy District Attorney Ben McLaughlin said no. The court therefore dismissed the charges in this case as well as in pending probation violation matters.
DISCUSSION
I. Violation of Defendant’s Right to Compulsory Process
The People contend the trial court improperly found that the prosecution violated defendant’s constitutional right to compulsory process by charging Christopher Crowl and Jessica Sneed with having committed perjury at defendant’s preliminary hearing.
“The right of an accused to compel witnesses to come into court and give evidence in the accused’s defense is a fundamental one.” (People v. Jacinto (2010) 49 Cal.4th 263, 268 (Jacinto).) The Sixth Amendment provides that “ ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. . . .’ This constitutional guarantee, generally termed the compulsory process clause, applies in both federal and state trials. [Citation.]” (Ibid., quoting Washington v. Texas (1967) 388 U.S. 14, 15, fn. 1.) “Article I, section 15 of the California Constitution similarly guarantees as a matter of state constitutional law that ‘[t]he defendant in a criminal cause has the right . . . to compel attendance of witnesses in the defendant’s behalf. . . .’ [The California Supreme Court], as the final arbiter of the meaning of the California Constitution, has likewise found the state constitutional right to compel the attendance of witnesses a basic component of a fair trial. [Citations.]” (Jacinto, at p. 269.)
As our Supreme Court has explained, “[a] criminal defendant’s rights under the compulsory process clause can be infringed in several ways. ‘They include, for example, statements to defense witnesses to the effect that they would be prosecuted for any crimes they reveal or commit in the course of their testimony. [Citations.] They also include statements to defense witnesses warning they would suffer untoward consequences in other cases if they were to testify on behalf of the defense. [Citations.] Finally, they include arresting a defense witness before he or other defense witnesses have given their testimony.’ [Citation.]” (Jacinto, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 269, quoting In re Martin (1987) 44 Cal.3d 1, 30-31 (Martin); accord, People v. Bryant (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 582, 590.)
To prevail on a claim of interference with the right to present witnesses under the compulsory process clause, a defendant must establish three elements. “First, he must demonstrate prosecutorial misconduct, i.e., conduct that was ‘entirely unnecessary to the proper performance of the prosecutor’s duties and was of such a nature as to transform a defense witness willing to testify into one unwilling to testify.’ [Citations.] [¶] Second, he must ‘establish interference, that is, a causal link between the prosecutorial misconduct and the defendant’s inability to present the witness.’ [Citations.] In this regard, the [defendant] is ‘not required to prove that the conduct under challenge was the “direct or exclusive” cause. [Citations.] Rather, he need only show that the conduct was a substantial cause. [Citations.] The misconduct in question may be deemed a substantial cause when, for example, it carries significant coercive force [citation] and is soon followed by the witness’s refusal to testify [citation].’ [Citation.]” (In re Williams (1994) 7 Cal.4th 572, 603 (Williams), quoting, inter alia, Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 31; accord, Jacinto, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 269-270.) “ ‘Finally, the defendant must show the testimony he was unable to present was material to his defense.’ [Citations.]” (Jacinto, at p. 270.)
In the present case, the People primarily address the first element—prosecutorial misconduct—in arguing that defendant’s due process right to compulsory process was not violated, but briefly argue, in addition, that defendant was not deprived of the opportunity to present meaningful evidence.
A. Prosecutorial Misconduct
According to the People, “courts do not find misconduct because a prosecutor charged a witness with perjury after the witness has committed that offense. Such action differs materially from a prosecutor’s threats to a witness about anticipated testimony. It is entirely within the proper performance of a prosecutor’s duties to investigate and charge a completed crime.” Thus, they continue, the arrest, interrogation, and filing of charges against the two witnesses in this case amounted to conduct that was not “ ‘entirely unnecessary to the proper performance of the prosecutor’s duties’ ” (Williams supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 603) and, therefore, the trial court’s finding of prosecutorial misconduct cannot be sustained.
In support of this argument, the People rely on Williams, supra, 7 Cal.4th 572 and Jacinto, supra, 49 Cal.4th 263. In Williams, our Supreme Court held, in habeas corpus proceedings, that the prosecution did not interfere with the petitioner’s right to present witnesses when it, inter alia, (1) indicted and arrested one defense witness for perjury in past cases two days before the petitioner’s evidentiary hearing on his habeas petition was scheduled to begin, and (2) indicted another defense witness for perjury some months before the hearing was to take place. (Williams, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 605-606.) With respect to the first witness, the record reflected that he had informed the prosecutor, well before his indictment, that his statement in a prior declaration that another witness had lied at the petitioner’s trial was itself a lie and, further, that he would so-testify at the petitioner’s hearing. (Ibid.) Based on these facts, the court concluded that, despite the timing of the witness’s indictment and arrest and his refusal to testify at the hearing, the petitioner had failed to show how the government’s conduct in arresting the witness for perjury “was wholly unnecessary to the performance of its duties and was of such a character as to transform [the witness] from a willing witness to one who refused to testify.” (Id. at p. 606.)
As to the second witness, the record showed that he was indicted for perjury months before the petitioner’s evidentiary hearing was set to begin. (Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 606.) The court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the purpose of the indictment was to intimidate the witness and keep him from testifying, given that the evidence showed that the prosecution was not apprised that the witness was a possible witness at the defendant’s hearing until eight months after his indictment. (Ibid.)
Thus, in Williams, the evidence affirmatively showed that the government had not indicted the two witnesses to force them or other witnesses to invoke their Fifth Amendment rights at the petitioner’s evidentiary hearing. The Williams court did not address whether arresting defense witnesses for perjury before a defendant’s trial in the distinct circumstances presented here could constitute interference with that defendant’s right to present witnesses.
In Jacinto, supra, 49 Cal.4th 263, 269, the defendant claimed that the prosecution had violated his compulsory process rights when the sheriff released a defense eyewitness, following his release from jail, to federal immigration officials, “knowing he would most likely be deported and thus unavailable to testify on defendant’s behalf.” Our Supreme Court found that the defendant had not satisfied the first element necessary to demonstrate such a violation: prosecutorial misconduct. First, it was the sheriff—acting independently and not at the prosecutor’s behest—who released the witness to immigration officials, and the sheriff’s acts could not be attributed to the prosecution. (Id. at pp. 270-271.) Second, even if the sheriff could be characterized as a member of the prosecution team, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had issued a federal immigration detainer for the witness once he was released from jail and, as the court observed, “The federal government’s power over immigration issues is supreme. [Citations.] Faced with an immigration detainer from ICE, the sheriff and his employees properly complied, as a matter of comity, by releasing [the witness] to ICE’s custody.” (Id. at pp. 272-273.) Third, the court observed that the defendant “was not powerless to ensure that [the witness] would appear at his trial,” given that there were procedures potentially available to the defendant to make certain the witness could testify, either in person or by deposition. (Id. at pp. 273-274.)
Jacinto thus is factually distinguishable from the present case in several ways and does not provide support for the People’s generalized argument that “the prosecutor does not commit misconduct when he engages in conduct that is legally permissible or authorized, even though that conduct ultimately results in the loss of a material defense witness.”
The California Supreme Court’s analysis in Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1 is more relevant to our inquiry than the cases cited by the People. In Martin, a prosecution investigator arrested Stephen Aguilar, the first defense witness to testify at the petitioner’s trial, just outside the courtroom in the presence of people the investigator knew to be defense witnesses who had not yet testified, immediately after Aguilar gave testimony that contradicted that of the prosecution’s key witness. (Id. at p. 33.) At the time of the arrest, the investigator saw no sign that Aguilar was going to flee. (Id. at p. 34.) In an opinion granting the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, our Supreme Court found that although there was no direct contemporaneous evidence of prosecutorial interference with the petitioner’s constitutional right to present the testimony of witnesses at trial, this evidence, along with evidence that another defense witness subsequently invoked his Fifth Amendment rights and refused to testify on the petitioner’s behalf, constituted circumstantial evidence from which the existence of such misconduct could be inferred. (Id. at pp. 33-34.)
The Attorney General also argued in Martin “that the arrest of Aguilar was proper as a constitutionally reasonable seizure of the person and as such was proper insofar as petitioner’s compulsory-process rights were concerned.” (Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 35.) The court rejected this argument, explaining that it does not follow that government conduct that does not violate the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures necessarily does not violate the Sixth Amendment’s recognition of a defendant’s right to present evidence on his own behalf. (Ibid.) The court concluded: “It is clear to us that the prosecution committed misconduct under the Sixth Amendment in arresting Aguilar when and where it did: [the investigator] engaged in activity that was completely unnecessary under the circumstances—he was under no legal or practical compulsion to make the arrest in the presence of defense witnesses and the press—and was of such a character as ‘to transform [a defense witness] from a willing witness to one who would refuse to testify’ [Citation].” (Ibid.)
Likewise, in the present case, simply because the District Attorney’s Office is authorized to arrest, interrogate, and charge people suspected of committing crimes, including perjury, does not mean it has carte blanche to engage in activity apparently designed to—and certainly with the effect of—undermining a defendant’s right to compulsory process. As in Martin, even assuming the prosecution’s conduct was otherwise proper, the timing and manner of the arrest, interrogation, and perjury charges filed against Christopher and Sneed were “completely unnecessary under the circumstances,” as was the use of a Ramey warrant, and support the inference that the prosecution interfered with defendant’s constitutional right to present the testimony of witnesses at trial. (Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 33, 35.)
Similarly, in Bryant, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d 582, 588-589, the sole non-police witness to the defendant’s traffic stop was arrested for perjury allegedly committed at defendant’s preliminary hearing. The witness subsequently refused to testify at defendant’s probation revocation hearing only after the prosecutor warned the witness that he would be facing another count of perjury if he testified consistently with his preliminary hearing testimony. (Ibid.) The appellate court held that the government’s coercive action caused this material witness to become unavailable, thereby violating the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial. (Id. at p. 588.)
Here, as the trial court stated, given the nature of the prosecution’s conduct, Sneed and Christopher plainly did not need to be reminded of the pending charges and the potential for additional charges to be filed before they exercised their Fifth Amendment rights.
In addition, as the trial court found at the hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss, the evidence in the record regarding the prosecution’s conduct raises a red flag regarding the motive for this highly unusual conduct. Moreover, regardless of motive, these actions are circumstantial evidence of misconduct, given that it is “difficult to imagine” that the prosecution’s conduct would not have intimidated both witnesses. (Bray v. Peyton, supra, 429 F.2d at p. 501; see also Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 33-34.) The trial court observed that the “net result” of the prosecution’s actions was that both witnesses would invoke their Fifth Amendment rights at defendant’s trial, as they did at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, because of the pending charges against them as well as “because it doesn’t take a mental genius to realize that if they testified at trial the same way they did at the preliminary hearing they’re gonna be charged additionally with perjury.” (Cf. Bryant, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at pp. 588-589.)
For these reasons, we reject the People’s central argument: that, because there was probable cause to arrest the two witnesses for perjury, the prosecution’s conduct cannot be considered “ ‘entirely unnecessary to the proper performance of the prosecutor’s duties.’ ” (Williams, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 603.) On the contrary, as we have explained and as Martin makes clear, this extraordinary rush to first obtain a Ramey warrant, and then to arrest, insistently interrogate, and charge these two defense witnesses with the commission of nonviolent crimes was “completely unnecessary under the circumstances” given that Cox was “under no legal or practical compulsion” to take these actions when and in the manner he did. (Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 35.) Accordingly, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Cox’s conduct on behalf of the District Attorney’s Office “was of such a character as ‘to transform [each of the two witnesses] from a willing witness to one who would refuse to testify,’ ” and therefore constituted prosecutorial misconduct. (Ibid.)
Finally, the People argue that “[a]dopting a rule that the prosecutor must delay filing a legally authorized criminal complaint against a potential defense witness until that witness has testified at defendant’s trial presents significant difficulties for the prosecutor,” including challenges related to statutes of limitations, motions for dismissal based on pre-accusation delay, and potential loss of evidence. (See People v. Pearson (Mich.App. 1975) 232 N.W.2d 408, 410 affd. in part and revd. in part in People v. Pearson (Mich. 1979) 273 N.W.2d 856 [Michigan Court of Appeal refused to “place the stamp of judicial approval upon requiring prosecuting attorneys to delay for an indeterminate time the filing of charges because an accused is a witness in a separate case”].) We adopt no such rule here. Rather, we simply conclude, in the particular circumstances of this case, that the evidence in the record supports the trial court’s finding that the prosecution’s unnecessary urgency in arresting, forcefully interrogating, and filing perjury and accessory after the fact charges against Sneed and Christopher resulted in effectively precluding these previously willing defense witnesses from testifying at defendant’s trial. This was misconduct.
B. Materiality
The People claim that the record does not support a finding that Sneed and Christopher’s testimony would have been material and favorable to defendant’s defense because perjured testimony is not material testimony.
We conclude that the People have forfeited this issue on appeal because they expressly conceded in the trial court that the two witnesses’ testimony was material to the defense. (Cf., e.g., People v. Miller (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 545, 551 [where District Attorney expressly conceded lack of probable cause for search, Attorney General could not justify search on that ground on appeal].)
To “demonstrate ‘materiality,’ ” the defendant “ ‘must at least make some plausible showing of how [the] testimony [of the witness] would have been both material and favorable to his defense.’ [Citation.]” (Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 32, quoting United States v. Valenzuela Bernal (1982) 458 U.S. 858, 867.)
In any event, Sneed’s and Christopher’s expected testimony plainly was material. The truth of the perjury allegations had not been adjudicated at the time of the court’s ruling on defendant’s motion to dismiss, and the witnesses had never testified differently under oath.
The court’s mere acknowledgement that these witnesses may have committed perjury does not constitute an adjudication that they in fact did so. (See Bryant, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 592, fn. 5 [“It is not the court nor the prosecuting attorney’s function to attempt to purge the court of a witness who might possibly offer perjured testimony. . . . Thus, the believability of the witness’ testimony goes to its weight not its admissibility”]; compare People v. Harbolt (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 140, 155 [where potential witness stated under oath that he had not committed crimes with which defendant was charged, materiality of his testimony was not demonstrated]; U.S. v. Williams (2d Cir. 2000) 205 F.3d 23, 30 [where trial court had found credible defense witness’s testimony at defendant’s second trial in which he recanted testimony presented at first trial, materiality was not shown].)
As the trial court explained when it ruled on the motion to dismiss, it was unlikely that defendant would testify, in light of the incriminating statements he made to police. Hence, “[y]ou take out the defendant and you take out the two defense witnesses, that’s what you’re left with[, the police officer’s story that defendant was the driver]. It would be a pretty short trial.” The record supports the trial court’s finding that Sneed and Christopher’s testimony “ ‘would have been both material and favorable to [defendant’s] defense.’ ” (Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 32.)
In sum, the trial court’s conclusion that the prosecution in this case violated defendant’s constitutional right to compulsory process is adequately supported by the record. (See, e.g., People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 472.)
II. Remedy
The People contend that, even if there was a constitutional violation, the trial court’s dismissal of the information was an abuse of discretion because a lesser sanction would have adequately protected defendant’s right to a fair trial.
Specifically, the People assert that the court could have used Sneed’s and Christopher’s preliminary hearing testimony, which would have allowed defendant to present his defense at trial despite the witnesses’ unavailability. In support of this argument they cite Evidence Code section 1291, which provides in relevant part: “(a) Evidence of former testimony is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) The party against whom the former testimony is offered was a party to the action or proceeding in which the testimony was given and had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that which he has at the hearing.” (Cf. People v. Conrad (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1175, 1186 [in context of evidence lost due to prosecutorial delay, trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed action even though an intermediate remedy was available that would have mitigated prejudice resulting from delay]; cf. People v. Woods (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 929, 937-939 [in affirming judgment of conviction following jury trial, appellate court held that defendant could not prove testimony of witnesses made unavailable due to prosecutorial misconduct was material since all of witness’ proposed testimony was presented to jury in other ways].)
We conclude that the People are precluded from arguing that the court’s dismissal of the information constituted an abuse of discretion in the circumstances of this case due to their active involvement in bringing about the dismissal. Their refusal to stipulate to the admissibility of the preliminary hearing transcript at trial invited the alleged error of which they now complain. (See, e.g., People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 549-550, fn. 3 [“The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error when ‘his own conduct induces the commission of error’ ”].)
Moreover, even if the People’s refusal to stipulate did not technically constitute invited error, they have forfeited the issue on appeal by failing to raise it in the trial court. (See, e.g., People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 590 [“ ‘ “[I]t is unfair to the trial judge and to the adverse party to take advantage of an error on appeal when it could easily have been corrected at the trial” ’ ”].) The prosecutor made a tactical decision at the hearing on the motion to dismiss to, in essence, “object” to the admissibility of the preliminary hearing transcript at trial by refusing to stipulate to its admission, thereby preserving its right to appeal the trial court’s substantive ruling and the consequent dismissal. It would be eminently unfair to permit the People to now argue on appeal that the court abused its discretion in refusing to let the case go forward using the preliminary hearing transcript after they refused to stipulate to the preliminary hearing testimony’s admission, and then failed to argue to the trial court that it was nonetheless admissible under Evidence Code section 1291, subdivision (a)(2). (Cf., e.g., People v. Miller, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 551 [where prosecution could have pursued two arguments simultaneously in trial court, but chose not to do so, “[f]airness dictates the prosecution accept the consequences of its decision”]; People v. Middleton (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 732, 737, fn. 2, quoting Steagald v. United States (1981) 451 U.S. 204, 209 [“the prosecution may lose the opportunity to challenge a defendant’s standing to appeal ‘when it has acquiesced in contrary findings by [the trial court] or when it has failed to raise such questions in a timely fashion during the litigation’ ”].)
We therefore conclude that the People’s actions in the trial court preclude them from now arguing that the trial court’s decision to dismiss the information in this case constituted an abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order dismissing the information in this matter is affirmed. The Clerk/Administrator of this Court is directed to forward a copy of this opinion to the California State Bar for review and further proceeding, if appropriate.
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Kline, P.J.
We concur:
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Haerle, J.
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Lambden, J.
These facts are taken from the testimony presented at the preliminary hearing, held on August 12, 2009.
Hynes later found a six- or twelve-pack of beer and a pack of cigarettes in the causeway. Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
For example, in his questioning of both witnesses, Cox falsely told Sneed and hinted to Christopher that the car, with defendant driving, had been captured on videotape by a surveillance camera. He also told them that they could mitigate how much trouble they were in by admitting that defendant was driving.
People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263; now codified at Penal Code section 817. When there is probable cause to arrest an individual, police may obtain a Ramey warrant to arrest that person in his or her home before criminal charges are filed. (See, e.g., (Goodwin v. Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 215, 218.) As the trial court noted, such a procedure is used infrequently, primarily in situations in which it is critical to arrest a suspect immediately.
Deputy District Attorney Ben McLaughlin, who appeared on behalf of the District Attorney’s Office at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, stated at the hearing and in his written opposition to the motion that, following the preliminary hearing, Deputy District Attorney Randy Mailman listened to the recording of defendant’s statements to the arresting officers, and “acted within her purview as a deputy district attorney to have charges investigated that she thought were sustainable. She received information pursuant to the investigation. The D.A.’s Office acted on that information.”
In ruling that dismissal of the charges was necessary, the court stated that it did not like this result because, if defendant had in fact been driving while under the influence, he should be punished for it. It also commented: “And it’s also the case that the witnesses here that we’re talking about very well may have committed perjury. There’s evidence to suggest that that’s true. And what’s gonna happen in those cases, I don’t know. But the situation is that the law has to apply equally no matter what kind of a case it is. . . .”
The parties seem uncertain about the applicable standard of review for a claim alleging violation of the right to compulsory process. While the cases generally do not explicitly discuss the standard of review, most appear to be applying the substantial evidence standard. (See, e.g., People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 472 [“We find the trial court’s conclusions adequately supported by the record”].) We adhere to that approach in this opinion, although we also conclude that the result would be the same utilizing either the substantial evidence or abuse of discretion standard of review.
The People do not argue that the causation element was not satisfied in this case, and we agree with their implicit admission that the causation element was in fact satisfied. (See Williams, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 603.)
The court also rejected the claim of prosecutorial misconduct as to three other witnesses who invoked their Fifth amendment rights at the petitioner’s evidentiary hearing. The court found that the petitioner had not established misconduct since there was no evidence that the indictments of the other two witnesses (see text, ante) “were unnecessary to the performance of the prosecution’s duties.” (Williams, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 607.) Contrary to the People’s interpretation, the court’s conclusion simply reflects, in light of the fact that the indictments of the other two witnesses did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct, that any intimidation other potential witnesses felt could not constitute prosecutorial misconduct based on those indictments.
Indeed, it would seem that if the Williams court believed that a defense witness’s perjury arrest or indictment prior to testifying at a defendant’s trial could never constitute prosecutorial misconduct, it would not have needed to go through the analysis it did before concluding that there had been no interference with the defendant’s compulsory process rights under the particular facts of the case.
The Martin court observed that it had come to the same conclusion as the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bray v. Peyton (4th Cir. 1970) 429 F.2d 500, 501, which held that the prosecution committed misconduct when it arrested a defense witness during trial, before he had testified, finding it “ ‘difficult to imagine’ ” that the incident would not intimidate both the witness who was arrested as well as other defense witnesses. (Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 35.)
In People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 458, which distinguished Martin and is similarly distinguishable from the present case, our Supreme Court found that there was no “evidence the witness was arrested in connection with this case or that his arrest on an unrelated warrant was engineered by the prosecutor, or indeed, that the prosecutor even knew about it. Thus the case is not like [Martin] in which we said the prosecutor acted improperly in causing a defense witness to be arrested as he left the stand, in an evident effort to intimidate him and prevent further testimony. [Citation.]”
The People assert that the trial court’s opinion that the extraordinary measures taken in this case reflect a goal of subverting defense testimony does not constitute substantial evidence of improper motives. They then go on to discuss the evidence of perjury supporting their conduct. First, a finding of improper motives is not necessary to our analysis. (See Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 31.) Second, neither the trial court nor this court need blind ourselves to the fact that perjury is committed regularly in our courtrooms but, nevertheless, perjury prosecutions are extremely rare. We need not ignore the clear inference that the nearly unheard of conduct by the prosecution in this case was designed to intimidate these witnesses and keep them from testifying for defendant. Third, the evidence of perjury was by no means overwhelming in this case. As the magistrate presiding over the preliminary hearing noted at the conclusion of that hearing: “I think there’s going to be a problem with this case under the burden of reasonable doubt.” Moreover, at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial court noted that the prosecution knew “there were some potential problems with the case because, arguably, [defendant], who is cousins with the witness Christopher Crowl, there was at least some resemblance—that could be arguable as to how much—but they were in the ballpark of looking like each other. And so I think somebody realized this case is in trouble.” Indeed, this was a case of conflicting evidence and witnesses, a classic case for a jury trial. (See Bryant, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 592, fn. 5, quoting Rosen v. United States (1918) 245 U.S. 467, 471 [discussing “ ‘the conviction of our time that the truth is more likely to be arrived at by hearing the testimony of all persons of competent understanding who may seem to have knowledge of the facts involved in a case, leaving the credit and weight of such testimony to be determined by the jury’ ”].)
In this regard, it is notable that the District Attorney’s Office insisted that Sneed plead guilty under oath, with a statement making clear that defendant was driving.
In their reply brief, the People argue for the first time that the trial court did not find that the action was “ ‘wholly unnecessary’ to the proper performance of the prosecutor’s duties,” and that, therefore, its ruling must have rested on a misunderstanding of the relevant law and cannot be upheld. Even were we to address this tardily raised point (see People v. Adams (1990) 216 Cal.App.3d 1431, 1441, fn. 2) [issues raised for first time in reply brief generally will not be considered on appeal]), we do not agree that the court’s failure to use particular language in making its ruling undermines its thoughtful, thorough analysis.
Because we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that prosecutorial misconduct occurred in this case, we are obligated to notify the State Bar of that misconduct with respect to the actions of Deputy District Attorney Ben McLaughlin and/or Deputy District Attorney Randy Mailman. (See Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6086.7, subd. (a)(2) [“[a] court shall notify the State Bar . . . “[w]henever a modification or reversal of a judgment in a judicial proceeding is based in whole or in part on the misconduct . . . of an attorney”].) Although subdivision (a)(2) of section 6086.7 states that such notification must be made upon “modification or reversal” of a judgment, we do not interpret the statute as relieving us of our reporting obligation merely because the trial court found the misconduct before we did.
The People assert that the prosecutor could not ethically stipulate to admission of testimony he believed was perjured. They cite People v. Jennings (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 899, 907, in which the appellate court stated that “a defense attorney has an ethical obligation not to present perjured testimony.” First, we are doubtful that entering into a stipulation in the circumstances of this case would constitute the People’s “presentation” of perjured testimony as discussed in People v. Jennings. Second, there is something unsettling about the People arguing here that in the trial court they could not have ethically agreed to the testimony’s admission at trial while now strenuously arguing that the trial court erred when it dismissed the information rather than finding that same testimony admissible at trial.
PAGE 24
PAGE 1
***
UPDATE: 4/25/11
◼ If Gallegos makes a list of law enforcement officers with ethics problems, does he have to put himself on it? - Humboldt Mirror
◼ link
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ROCKY CROWL, Defendant and Respondent.
A127221 (Humboldt County Super. Ct. No. CR093710)
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND DENYING REHEARING [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the unpublished opinion filed herein on March 29, 2011, be modified as follows:
On page 1, in the caption, the appellate designations for the parties should be reversed, see above and as follows: “The People, Plaintiff and Appellant, vs. Rocky Crowl, Defendant and Respondent.”
On page 6, in the first sentence of the second full paragraph, add the following parenthetical as follows: “The court also considered at the hearing a series of e-mails between Deputy District Attorney Ben McLaughlin (who apparently was the prosecutor assigned to try defendant’s case) and the office of Sneed’s counsel, . . . ”
On page 8, add the following five sentences to the end of footnote 6: “McLaughlin further stated at the hearing, ‘Miss Mailman after reviewing audio tape thought there might be probable cause to suspect perjury had occurred. A warrant was prepared, and a judge reviewed the warrant.’ McLaughlin also stated that, after the interviews with Sneed and Christopher, ‘Mr. Cox prepared a report, submitted the report to [Assistant District Attorney Wes] Keat. Mr. Keat makes the charging decisions. Reports for charges were filed.’ ”
On page 18, footnote 17 should be changed to read as follows: “Because we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that prosecutorial misconduct occurred in this case, we are obligated to notify the State Bar of that misconduct. The record suggests that one or more of the following attorneys from the District Attorney’s Office were involved in the misconduct in question: Deputy District Attorney Ben McLaughlin, Deputy District Attorney Randy Mailman, and/or Assistant District Attorney Wes Keat. However, that will be for the State Bar to determine. (See Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6086.7, subd. (a)(2) [‘[a] court shall notify the State Bar . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [w]henever a modification or reversal of a judgment in a judicial proceeding is based in whole or in part on the misconduct . . . of an attorney’].) Although subdivision (a)(2) of section 6086.7 states that such notification must be made upon ‘modification or reversal’ of a judgment, we do not interpret the statute as relieving us of our reporting obligation merely because the trial court found the misconduct before we did.”
There is no change in the judgment.
Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied.
Dated: ___________________________
____________________________P.J.
Sunday, March 06, 2011
Arcata parents arrested, child sent to Oakland hospital
◼ Arcata parents arrested, child sent to Oakland hospital
The parents of a 3-month-old Arcata boy were arrested Thursday after the child was brought to the emergency room with severe injuries.
Michelle Darlene Thompson, 34, and Brandon Scott Santiago, 21, both of Arcata, were arrested and booked into Humboldt County jail on suspicion of willful injury to a child and corporal injury to a child, according to the Arcata Police Department....
The child was flown to Oakland Children's Hospital due to the severity of the injuries, according to police.
Sgt. Ben Whetstine said the APD cannot release the nature of the injuries....
The parents of a 3-month-old Arcata boy were arrested Thursday after the child was brought to the emergency room with severe injuries.
Michelle Darlene Thompson, 34, and Brandon Scott Santiago, 21, both of Arcata, were arrested and booked into Humboldt County jail on suspicion of willful injury to a child and corporal injury to a child, according to the Arcata Police Department....
The child was flown to Oakland Children's Hospital due to the severity of the injuries, according to police.
Sgt. Ben Whetstine said the APD cannot release the nature of the injuries....
Wednesday, February 23, 2011
Whatever happened to Eddie David Lee? And Maggie Jean Wortman UPDATED
Almost a year ago Eddie David Lee pled not guilty to murder charges. Where is he now and where is Gallegos at on this case?
***
And how about ◼ Maggie Jean Wortman
Humboldt County Sheriff's Office detectives arrested Wortman at the jail... after a two-month investigation. She was in custody for an alleged probation violation stemming from a conviction for maintaining a residence for drug activities. The investigation spawned after Wortman's son, Michael Phillip Acosta III, was transported to a local hospital because he wasn't breathing on Nov. 21 and was later pronounced dead. The allegations are that she killed her 6-week-old son by feeding him methamphetamine-laced breast milk. ...charges of involuntary manslaughter and two counts of felony child endangerment.
UPDATE: ◼ Judge dismisses murder charge against Loleta woman - Thadeus Greenson/Times Standard
A Humboldt County judge has dismissed the murder charge facing a Loleta mother accused of killing her baby with methamphetamine-laced breast milk last year.
In a ruling filed Wednesday, Humboldt County Superior Court Judge Bruce Watson threw out the murder charge against Maggie Jean Wortman, 27, finding that no evidence was presented at the case's preliminary hearing to establish that Wortman knew she was endangering her infant son's life when she breastfed him after allegedly smoking methamphetamine.
***
And how about ◼ Maggie Jean Wortman
Humboldt County Sheriff's Office detectives arrested Wortman at the jail... after a two-month investigation. She was in custody for an alleged probation violation stemming from a conviction for maintaining a residence for drug activities. The investigation spawned after Wortman's son, Michael Phillip Acosta III, was transported to a local hospital because he wasn't breathing on Nov. 21 and was later pronounced dead. The allegations are that she killed her 6-week-old son by feeding him methamphetamine-laced breast milk. ...charges of involuntary manslaughter and two counts of felony child endangerment.
UPDATE: ◼ Judge dismisses murder charge against Loleta woman - Thadeus Greenson/Times Standard
A Humboldt County judge has dismissed the murder charge facing a Loleta mother accused of killing her baby with methamphetamine-laced breast milk last year.
In a ruling filed Wednesday, Humboldt County Superior Court Judge Bruce Watson threw out the murder charge against Maggie Jean Wortman, 27, finding that no evidence was presented at the case's preliminary hearing to establish that Wortman knew she was endangering her infant son's life when she breastfed him after allegedly smoking methamphetamine.
Thursday, January 27, 2011
Maggie Jean Wortman pleaded not guilty Tuesday to allegations that she killed her 6-week-old son by feeding him methamphetamine-laced breast milk. UPDATED
◼ Loleta mom pleads not guilty to manslaughter charge; mother allegedly passed lethal dose of meth to infant son through breast milk
A 26-year-old Loleta woman pleaded not guilty Tuesday to allegations that she killed her 6-week-old son by feeding him methamphetamine-laced breast milk.
Maggie Jean Wortman stood before Humboldt County Superior Court Judge Timothy Cissna clad in a blue jail jumpsuit Tuesday with her hands shackled in front of her and pleaded not guilty to charges of involuntary manslaughter and two counts of felony child endangerment. If convicted on all counts, Wortman faces a maximum prison sentence of nine years.
Wortman was polite and respectful of the court, but reserved, throughout her brief court appearance Tuesday. When Cissna called the next case on his calendar, Wortman sat down and appeared to begin to weep until being led from the courtroom by a bailiff.
Humboldt County Sheriff's Office detectives arrested Wortman at the jail on Friday after a two-month investigation. She was in custody for an alleged probation violation stemming from a conviction for maintaining a residence for drug activities. The investigation spawned after Wortman's son, Michael Phillip Acosta III, was transported to a local hospital because he wasn't breathing on Nov. 21 and was later pronounced dead.
A forensic pathologist who reviewed autopsy and toxicology results on the infant concluded his death was caused by “methamphetamine toxicity.” A subsequent toxicology screen of Wortman's 19-month-old daughter also came back positive for methamphetamine, prompting Child Welfare Services to take her into protective custody.
Acosta?
UPDATE: ◼ Judge dismisses murder charge against Loleta woman - Thadeus Greenson/Times Standard
A Humboldt County judge has dismissed the murder charge facing a Loleta mother accused of killing her baby with methamphetamine-laced breast milk last year.
In a ruling filed Wednesday, Humboldt County Superior Court Judge Bruce Watson threw out the murder charge against Maggie Jean Wortman, 27, finding that no evidence was presented at the case's preliminary hearing to establish that Wortman knew she was endangering her infant son's life when she breastfed him after allegedly smoking methamphetamine.
A 26-year-old Loleta woman pleaded not guilty Tuesday to allegations that she killed her 6-week-old son by feeding him methamphetamine-laced breast milk.
Maggie Jean Wortman stood before Humboldt County Superior Court Judge Timothy Cissna clad in a blue jail jumpsuit Tuesday with her hands shackled in front of her and pleaded not guilty to charges of involuntary manslaughter and two counts of felony child endangerment. If convicted on all counts, Wortman faces a maximum prison sentence of nine years.
Wortman was polite and respectful of the court, but reserved, throughout her brief court appearance Tuesday. When Cissna called the next case on his calendar, Wortman sat down and appeared to begin to weep until being led from the courtroom by a bailiff.
Humboldt County Sheriff's Office detectives arrested Wortman at the jail on Friday after a two-month investigation. She was in custody for an alleged probation violation stemming from a conviction for maintaining a residence for drug activities. The investigation spawned after Wortman's son, Michael Phillip Acosta III, was transported to a local hospital because he wasn't breathing on Nov. 21 and was later pronounced dead.
A forensic pathologist who reviewed autopsy and toxicology results on the infant concluded his death was caused by “methamphetamine toxicity.” A subsequent toxicology screen of Wortman's 19-month-old daughter also came back positive for methamphetamine, prompting Child Welfare Services to take her into protective custody.
Acosta?
UPDATE: ◼ Judge dismisses murder charge against Loleta woman - Thadeus Greenson/Times Standard
A Humboldt County judge has dismissed the murder charge facing a Loleta mother accused of killing her baby with methamphetamine-laced breast milk last year.
In a ruling filed Wednesday, Humboldt County Superior Court Judge Bruce Watson threw out the murder charge against Maggie Jean Wortman, 27, finding that no evidence was presented at the case's preliminary hearing to establish that Wortman knew she was endangering her infant son's life when she breastfed him after allegedly smoking methamphetamine.
Wednesday, January 26, 2011
Paul Gallegos' DA's Office on FOX news online - HOPE THEY'RE PAYING ATTENTION.
◼ Not guilty plea in CA meth-laced breastmilk death Jan 26, 2011 7:32 PM EST
A Northern California woman has pleaded not guilty to killing her 6-week-old baby by feeding him methamphetamine-laced breast milk.
Prosecutors say 26-year-old Maggie Jean Wortman of Loleta used methamphetamine and passed it to her two children while breast-feeding.
Detectives arrested Wortman last week after a two-month investigation found her son died in November due to "methamphetamine toxicity."
Wortman entered her plea Tuesday in Humboldt County Superior Court. She is charged with involuntary manslaughter and two counts of felony child endangerment.
The Times-Standard of Eureka reports that authorities placed Wortman's 19-month-old daughter in protective custody after she tested positive for methamphetamine.
Wortman faces a maximum prison sentence of nine years if convicted on all counts.
___
◼ Information from: Times-Standard, http://www.times-standard.com
◼ Loleta mom pleads not guilty to manslaughter charge; mother allegedly passed lethal dose of meth to infant son through breast milk
Gallegos hits the big time.
A Northern California woman has pleaded not guilty to killing her 6-week-old baby by feeding him methamphetamine-laced breast milk.
Prosecutors say 26-year-old Maggie Jean Wortman of Loleta used methamphetamine and passed it to her two children while breast-feeding.
Detectives arrested Wortman last week after a two-month investigation found her son died in November due to "methamphetamine toxicity."
Wortman entered her plea Tuesday in Humboldt County Superior Court. She is charged with involuntary manslaughter and two counts of felony child endangerment.
The Times-Standard of Eureka reports that authorities placed Wortman's 19-month-old daughter in protective custody after she tested positive for methamphetamine.
Wortman faces a maximum prison sentence of nine years if convicted on all counts.
___
◼ Information from: Times-Standard, http://www.times-standard.com
◼ Loleta mom pleads not guilty to manslaughter charge; mother allegedly passed lethal dose of meth to infant son through breast milk
Gallegos hits the big time.
Tuesday, April 27, 2010
Garberville hotel shooting
◼ link
At about 1 a.m., a man renting a room at the Garberville Motel on Redwood Drive reported that two men were outside his door yelling at him, according to a Humboldt County Sheriff's Office press release. When he looked through the peephole of the door, he saw one of the men was armed with a rifle.
The man in the hotel room moved into the bathroom and called 911. While he was on the phone with dispatchers, one of the suspects allegedly fired six or seven shots into the door, according to the press release.
A responding deputy spotted two men walking away from the motel, and recognized one of the subjects from the caller's description. Chris David Collins, 58, and Christopher William Dalzin, 22, both of Garberville, were arrested at the scene. The deputy also located a loaded rifle on the ground near the men, according to the press release....
Collins and Dalzin were booked into the Humboldt County jail on suspicion of assault with a deadly weapon, and shooting at an inhabited dwelling, according to the Sheriff's Office. Collins was also booked on suspicion of a probation violation and is ineligible to post bail due to his probation status. Dalzin's bail was set at $100,000.
Should be interesting.
At about 1 a.m., a man renting a room at the Garberville Motel on Redwood Drive reported that two men were outside his door yelling at him, according to a Humboldt County Sheriff's Office press release. When he looked through the peephole of the door, he saw one of the men was armed with a rifle.
The man in the hotel room moved into the bathroom and called 911. While he was on the phone with dispatchers, one of the suspects allegedly fired six or seven shots into the door, according to the press release.
A responding deputy spotted two men walking away from the motel, and recognized one of the subjects from the caller's description. Chris David Collins, 58, and Christopher William Dalzin, 22, both of Garberville, were arrested at the scene. The deputy also located a loaded rifle on the ground near the men, according to the press release....
Collins and Dalzin were booked into the Humboldt County jail on suspicion of assault with a deadly weapon, and shooting at an inhabited dwelling, according to the Sheriff's Office. Collins was also booked on suspicion of a probation violation and is ineligible to post bail due to his probation status. Dalzin's bail was set at $100,000.
Should be interesting.
Friday, February 26, 2010
One suspects pleads not guilty to Willow Creek man's murder
◼ TS One suspects pleads not guilty to Willow Creek man's murder
◼ TS Two arrested on suspicion of killing Willow Creek man 2.23.10
◼ TS Court dates scheduled in Willow Creek homicide case 2.26.10
One of two men arrested last week on suspicion of killing a Willow Creek man pleaded not guilty to the charges Wednesday while the other is expected to enter a plea today.
Eddie David Lee, 21, and Limmie Greg Curry III, 19, face charges related to the death of a man believed to be William “Billie” Reid, 46, who was reported missing by his family on Feb. 15. A body believed to be Reid's was found Saturday after authorities searched Reid's home. Lee and Curry are scheduled to return to court today after Lee's lawyer requested more time to review the charges.
Lee and Curry are being held on suspicion of murder with the special circumstance that it was intentional and carried out for financial gain, according to the Humboldt County jail. Lee faces other allegations, as well, including possession of marijuana for sale and committing a felony while armed with a deadly weapon.
Curry was appointed a public defender after the Humboldt County Alternate Counsel Office declared a conflict, apparently related to the victim. Curry entered a plea of not guilty Wednesday and a denial of the special circumstances. To the court, Curry stated he was attempting to hire a private attorney but accepted the public defender appointment until he is able to do so.....
◼ TS Two arrested on suspicion of killing Willow Creek man 2.23.10
Two men already in custody at the Humboldt County jail were charged Saturday with allegedly killing a 46-year-old Willow Creek man who was reported missing about a week ago.
According to the Humboldt County Sheriff's Office, William “Billie” Reid was reported missing by his family on Feb. 15. Eddie David Lee, 21, and Limmie Greg Curry III, 19, were arrested for the killing after authorities searched Reid's home and found his body, following a short but seemingly complicated investigation.
◼ TS Court dates scheduled in Willow Creek homicide case 2.26.10
Friday, January 08, 2010
Bradshaw Murder Update
◼ Authorities believe they have found the body of missing McKinleyville woman
Thadeus Greenson reports: Authorities believe they have recovered the body of Monica Bradshaw, a 53-year-old McKinleyville woman whose husband of 30 years stands accused of her murder.
Chief Investigator Mike Hislop of the Humboldt County District Attorney's Office said a joint recovery effort by his office and the Humboldt County Sheriff's Office on Thursday in a wooded area outside McKinleyville was fruitful, and that investigators unearthed a body believed to be Bradshaw.
”I would say that the search was very successful,” Hislop said. “The DA's Office worked hand-in-hand with Sheriff's Office personnel in a coordinated effort. It was a team effort and it went very well.”...
...District Attorney Paul Gallegos said shortly after Robin Bradshaw's arrest that he believed there was enough evidence to try him even without a body.
”His wife is a missing person, and we believe that the compelling evidence we have indicates that she is missing because she is dead, and that Mr. Bradshaw buried her at some currently undisclosed location,” Gallegos said at the time.
Authorities now believe that location was a forested area on Fieldbrook Road, just outside McKinleyville. Late Thursday, a gate on the north side of the street was marked with police tape, and a number of vehicles were parked by the roadway. The site is less than three miles from where the couple lived.
Hislop declined to discuss the details of the search, but said more information would likely be made available in the coming days....
Court documents also state that two people close to Robin Bradshaw have told authorities that he made confessions to them about the crime, and that he said it was an act of self-defense.
One of the individuals told investigators that Robin Bradshaw said his wife attacked him with a crowbar. Robin Bradshaw reportedly then told the person that he was able to wrestle the crowbar away from his wife, and then hit her over the head with it, causing her to fall into the bathtub. According to the affidavit, Robin Bradshaw reportedly said he then hit his wife twice more, once in the head and once in the shoulder.
The person further told investigators, according to the affidavit, that Robin Bradshaw confessed to first burying his wife in a shallow grave in the backyard of his home, only to later dig her body up and bury it on an undeveloped Danco subdivision off of Fieldbrook Road in McKinleyville.
***
PREVIOUSLY:
◼ DA's office (Paul Gallegos) still undecided in Bradshaw case; Gallegos to talk to pathologist next week May 28, 2010
◼ Bradshaw sentencing postponed, Gallegos "weighing" decision May 5, 2010
...Humboldt County District Attorney Paul Gallegos received Super's report last week, but has yet to decide how to proceed with the case. At Tuesday's hearing, Bradshaw's attorney, Peter Martin, said Gallegos had contacted him asking that the sentencing hearing be postponed.
”He wants more time, I believe, to review the medical report and to request supporting materials from the medical examiner,” Martin said....
◼ ”It's going to be something Paul's going to have to think about.” April 27, 2010
-- Bradshaw autopsy report with Humboldt County DA; indicates blunt force trauma as cause of death
◼ Autopsy report coming in Bradshaw case; plea agreement hinges on results for McKinleyville man accused of wife's murder APRIL 24, 2010
◼ Bradshaw positively identified; full autopsy report pending more test results FEBRUARY 01, 2010
◼ Autopsy set for Sunday in Bradshaw case JANUARY 23, 2010
◼ ANOTHER PLEA DEAL - Bradshaw agreed to give location of body in plea deal JANUARY 09, 2010
Robin Stuart Bradshaw entered into a plea agreement with prosecutors last month, agreeing to disclose the location of his wife's body and plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter, court records show.
◼ Authorities believe they have found the body of missing McKinleyville woman JANUARY 08, 2010
The person further told investigators, according to the affidavit, that Robin Bradshaw confessed to first burying his wife in a shallow grave in the backyard of his home, only to later dig her body up and bury it on an undeveloped Danco subdivision off of Fieldbrook Road in McKinleyville.
◼ Hearing for McKinleyville murder case continued NOVEMBER 05, 2009
◼ Bradshaw Prelim continued to Nov. 5 SEPTEMBER 30, 2009
◼ Prelim for Robin Stuart Bradshaw JULY 07, 2009
◼ Bradshaw pleads not guilty to murdering wife June 16, 2009
◼ Robin Stuart Bradshaw, arrested JUNE 16, 2009
◼ Second search warrant issued in missing woman case - and a request to seal documents January 29, 2009
◼ Monica Bradshaw: MISSING January 27, 2009
Thadeus Greenson reports: Authorities believe they have recovered the body of Monica Bradshaw, a 53-year-old McKinleyville woman whose husband of 30 years stands accused of her murder.
Chief Investigator Mike Hislop of the Humboldt County District Attorney's Office said a joint recovery effort by his office and the Humboldt County Sheriff's Office on Thursday in a wooded area outside McKinleyville was fruitful, and that investigators unearthed a body believed to be Bradshaw.
”I would say that the search was very successful,” Hislop said. “The DA's Office worked hand-in-hand with Sheriff's Office personnel in a coordinated effort. It was a team effort and it went very well.”...
...District Attorney Paul Gallegos said shortly after Robin Bradshaw's arrest that he believed there was enough evidence to try him even without a body.
”His wife is a missing person, and we believe that the compelling evidence we have indicates that she is missing because she is dead, and that Mr. Bradshaw buried her at some currently undisclosed location,” Gallegos said at the time.
Authorities now believe that location was a forested area on Fieldbrook Road, just outside McKinleyville. Late Thursday, a gate on the north side of the street was marked with police tape, and a number of vehicles were parked by the roadway. The site is less than three miles from where the couple lived.
Hislop declined to discuss the details of the search, but said more information would likely be made available in the coming days....
Court documents also state that two people close to Robin Bradshaw have told authorities that he made confessions to them about the crime, and that he said it was an act of self-defense.
One of the individuals told investigators that Robin Bradshaw said his wife attacked him with a crowbar. Robin Bradshaw reportedly then told the person that he was able to wrestle the crowbar away from his wife, and then hit her over the head with it, causing her to fall into the bathtub. According to the affidavit, Robin Bradshaw reportedly said he then hit his wife twice more, once in the head and once in the shoulder.
The person further told investigators, according to the affidavit, that Robin Bradshaw confessed to first burying his wife in a shallow grave in the backyard of his home, only to later dig her body up and bury it on an undeveloped Danco subdivision off of Fieldbrook Road in McKinleyville.
***
PREVIOUSLY:
◼ DA's office (Paul Gallegos) still undecided in Bradshaw case; Gallegos to talk to pathologist next week May 28, 2010
◼ Bradshaw sentencing postponed, Gallegos "weighing" decision May 5, 2010
...Humboldt County District Attorney Paul Gallegos received Super's report last week, but has yet to decide how to proceed with the case. At Tuesday's hearing, Bradshaw's attorney, Peter Martin, said Gallegos had contacted him asking that the sentencing hearing be postponed.
”He wants more time, I believe, to review the medical report and to request supporting materials from the medical examiner,” Martin said....
◼ ”It's going to be something Paul's going to have to think about.” April 27, 2010
-- Bradshaw autopsy report with Humboldt County DA; indicates blunt force trauma as cause of death
◼ Autopsy report coming in Bradshaw case; plea agreement hinges on results for McKinleyville man accused of wife's murder APRIL 24, 2010
◼ Bradshaw positively identified; full autopsy report pending more test results FEBRUARY 01, 2010
◼ Autopsy set for Sunday in Bradshaw case JANUARY 23, 2010
◼ ANOTHER PLEA DEAL - Bradshaw agreed to give location of body in plea deal JANUARY 09, 2010
Robin Stuart Bradshaw entered into a plea agreement with prosecutors last month, agreeing to disclose the location of his wife's body and plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter, court records show.
◼ Authorities believe they have found the body of missing McKinleyville woman JANUARY 08, 2010
The person further told investigators, according to the affidavit, that Robin Bradshaw confessed to first burying his wife in a shallow grave in the backyard of his home, only to later dig her body up and bury it on an undeveloped Danco subdivision off of Fieldbrook Road in McKinleyville.
◼ Hearing for McKinleyville murder case continued NOVEMBER 05, 2009
◼ Bradshaw Prelim continued to Nov. 5 SEPTEMBER 30, 2009
◼ Prelim for Robin Stuart Bradshaw JULY 07, 2009
◼ Bradshaw pleads not guilty to murdering wife June 16, 2009
◼ Robin Stuart Bradshaw, arrested JUNE 16, 2009
◼ Second search warrant issued in missing woman case - and a request to seal documents January 29, 2009
◼ Monica Bradshaw: MISSING January 27, 2009
Thursday, January 07, 2010
Arrest made in Van Alstine killing
◼ Arrest made in Van Alstine killing
Detectives investigating the November killing of Robert Van Alstine arrested a man Wednesday who was already in jail on unrelated charges.
The Humboldt County Sheriff's Office said Johnny Lindel Lewis, 28, of Eureka, was booked on suspicion of murder in the stabbing death of Van Alstine, 30, on Nov. 18.
Van Alstine arrived at the front door of a business around 4:30 a.m. the day he was killed, banging on the door and asking for help. He had been stabbed once.
◼ Second arrest made in Van Alstine killing
A second person has been arrested in connection to the November stabbing death of Robert Van Alstine while the first suspect made his first court appearance to face a murder charge on Friday.
The Humboldt County Sheriff's Office said Andrea Janette Marr, 24, of Eureka, turned herself in around 5 p.m. Thursday after Eureka police officers, who know her, spread the word around her known haunts that she had a murder warrant.
Detectives investigating the November killing of Robert Van Alstine arrested a man Wednesday who was already in jail on unrelated charges.
The Humboldt County Sheriff's Office said Johnny Lindel Lewis, 28, of Eureka, was booked on suspicion of murder in the stabbing death of Van Alstine, 30, on Nov. 18.
Van Alstine arrived at the front door of a business around 4:30 a.m. the day he was killed, banging on the door and asking for help. He had been stabbed once.
◼ Second arrest made in Van Alstine killing
A second person has been arrested in connection to the November stabbing death of Robert Van Alstine while the first suspect made his first court appearance to face a murder charge on Friday.
The Humboldt County Sheriff's Office said Andrea Janette Marr, 24, of Eureka, turned herself in around 5 p.m. Thursday after Eureka police officers, who know her, spread the word around her known haunts that she had a murder warrant.
Wednesday, December 23, 2009
David Earl Sanford, 47, of Fieldbrook
◼ Detectives trying to track down witnesses in homicide case
Detectives investigating the death of a man whose body was found earlier this month on a Mad River bar are following up on leads, but some of the people they want to talk to are seemingly hard to find.
The death of David Earl Sanford, 47, of Fieldbrook, was ruled a homicide Friday after a forensic pathologist examined the body, which was found Dec. 13.
Humboldt County Sheriff's Office Sgt. Wayne Hanson said the detectives working the case have been talking to some people of interest, but others, because they are believed to be transients, have been hard to track down.
When Sanford's body was found it had visible injuries, but it is still unclear if the injuries contributed to his death.
Related:
◼ Unidentified man found dead at Mad River bar 12/14/2009
◼ Name of dead man released 12/15/2009
Detectives investigating the death of a man whose body was found earlier this month on a Mad River bar are following up on leads, but some of the people they want to talk to are seemingly hard to find.
The death of David Earl Sanford, 47, of Fieldbrook, was ruled a homicide Friday after a forensic pathologist examined the body, which was found Dec. 13.
Humboldt County Sheriff's Office Sgt. Wayne Hanson said the detectives working the case have been talking to some people of interest, but others, because they are believed to be transients, have been hard to track down.
When Sanford's body was found it had visible injuries, but it is still unclear if the injuries contributed to his death.
Related:
◼ Unidentified man found dead at Mad River bar 12/14/2009
◼ Name of dead man released 12/15/2009
Tuesday, December 15, 2009
Another body
◼ Unidentified man found dead at Mad River bar 12/14/2009
◼ Name of dead man released 12/15/2009
The Humboldt County Sheriff's Office has released the name of a man found dead on a Mad River bar Sunday.
The death of David Earl Sanford, 47, is being treated as suspicious. It is believed Sanford was a transient living in a tent found near his body.
He had some visible injuries, but it is unclear if they contributed to his death, the Sheriff's Office said.
The Sheriff's Office is not releasing any other details about the injuries. An autopsy is tentatively being scheduled for later in the week.
Sanford's body was found around 10 a.m. Sunday near Boyd Road on the south side of the river.
Anyone with information on Sanford can call Detective Troy Garey at 268-3643.
◼ Detectives trying to track down witnesses in homicide case
Detectives investigating the death of a man whose body was found earlier this month on a Mad River bar are following up on leads, but some of the people they want to talk to are seemingly hard to find.
The death of David Earl Sanford, 47, of Fieldbrook, was ruled a homicide Friday after a forensic pathologist examined the body, which was found Dec. 13.
Humboldt County Sheriff's Office Sgt. Wayne Hanson said the detectives working the case have been talking to some people of interest, but others, because they are believed to be transients, have been hard to track down.
When Sanford's body was found it had visible injuries, but it is still unclear if the injuries contributed to his death.
◼ Name of dead man released 12/15/2009
The Humboldt County Sheriff's Office has released the name of a man found dead on a Mad River bar Sunday.
The death of David Earl Sanford, 47, is being treated as suspicious. It is believed Sanford was a transient living in a tent found near his body.
He had some visible injuries, but it is unclear if they contributed to his death, the Sheriff's Office said.
The Sheriff's Office is not releasing any other details about the injuries. An autopsy is tentatively being scheduled for later in the week.
Sanford's body was found around 10 a.m. Sunday near Boyd Road on the south side of the river.
Anyone with information on Sanford can call Detective Troy Garey at 268-3643.
◼ Detectives trying to track down witnesses in homicide case
Detectives investigating the death of a man whose body was found earlier this month on a Mad River bar are following up on leads, but some of the people they want to talk to are seemingly hard to find.
The death of David Earl Sanford, 47, of Fieldbrook, was ruled a homicide Friday after a forensic pathologist examined the body, which was found Dec. 13.
Humboldt County Sheriff's Office Sgt. Wayne Hanson said the detectives working the case have been talking to some people of interest, but others, because they are believed to be transients, have been hard to track down.
When Sanford's body was found it had visible injuries, but it is still unclear if the injuries contributed to his death.
Thursday, September 17, 2009
Arrest warrant for Donny Ray Best
◼ Sheriff's investigation in Kansas leads to warrant for Trinidad death
A car and two guns have allegedly linked a Tennessee man to the death of a Trinidad resident earlier this month, prompting the issuance of a $1 million Humboldt County arrest warrant on Wednesday.
Donny Ray Best, 52, of Athens, Tenn., was stopped by the Kansas Highway Patrol on Sept. 5 in a green Buick LeSabre registered to Trinidad resident William John Lundy, 59.
Due to suspicious circumstances, KHP requested the Humboldt County Sheriff's Office perform a welfare check on Lundy, who was found dead in his fifth-wheel travel trailer that same day.
The Humboldt County Coroner's Office later determined that Lundy died from a gunshot wound.
Humboldt investigators flew to Kansas to interview Best and collect evidence with search warrants prepared by the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, including Best's fingerprints, DNA and his cell phone records, said Brenda Godsey, spokeswoman for the Sheriff's Office. His clothing was also seized.
”We got a search warrant to take his clothing and have it analyzed to see if there's additional evidence,” she said.
Three guns were also seized from Best's vehicle, two of which have been linked to Lundy, according to the Missouri branch of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.
A car and two guns have allegedly linked a Tennessee man to the death of a Trinidad resident earlier this month, prompting the issuance of a $1 million Humboldt County arrest warrant on Wednesday.
Donny Ray Best, 52, of Athens, Tenn., was stopped by the Kansas Highway Patrol on Sept. 5 in a green Buick LeSabre registered to Trinidad resident William John Lundy, 59.
Due to suspicious circumstances, KHP requested the Humboldt County Sheriff's Office perform a welfare check on Lundy, who was found dead in his fifth-wheel travel trailer that same day.
The Humboldt County Coroner's Office later determined that Lundy died from a gunshot wound.
Humboldt investigators flew to Kansas to interview Best and collect evidence with search warrants prepared by the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, including Best's fingerprints, DNA and his cell phone records, said Brenda Godsey, spokeswoman for the Sheriff's Office. His clothing was also seized.
”We got a search warrant to take his clothing and have it analyzed to see if there's additional evidence,” she said.
Three guns were also seized from Best's vehicle, two of which have been linked to Lundy, according to the Missouri branch of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.
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